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“Opportunity is missed by most people because it is dressed in overalls and looks 
like work.” (Thomas Edison). I certainly tried my hardest to avoid work over the years 
and I had nothing to show but faint memories and crazy stories. That is until I grabbed 
opportunity by the throat, wrestled it down, and made it mine.  I am indebted to several 
people for letting me find these opportunities and kicking me in the rear when I did not. 
Thanks Mom & Dad for giving me the freedom of choice and being supportive of my 
endeavors. I know you never thought your youngest son would be called ‘Doctor’, but 
guess what? To my wife Jerae, we have known nothing but the life of poor students, but 
now you get to experience life married to a poor assistant professor. We started this 
journey together a mere two weeks after we were married and you have certainly been a 
trooper. Thank you for putting up with me and the long hours I needed to devote to 
reaching this milestone. While you give me all the credit for this degree you deserve at 
least half. I love you.  I also wish to thank my friends and colleagues Tracy Kantrowitz, 
David Finch, and Steve Vodanovich for all of their support and insight into this project 
and graduate school as a whole. You three have certainly made this journey a bit more 
fun. I also wish to formally thank my committee, for helping to make this study that 
much better. Thanks!  
 
Oh yea, a wise man once said: “If life gives you lemons, make lemonade. If life gives you 
limes, make margaritas” (Jimmy Buffett). 
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Occupational safety has once again become an inviting area of research and 
application for organizational researchers. Researchers have abandoned the search for the 
accident-prone employee and begun to identify the underlying symptoms that might lead 
to unsafe behaviors and accidents. The current research built upon theory and recent 
findings by integrating regulatory focus theory into an interactional model of 
occupational safety and productivity in an attempt to explain and predict safety 
performance and speed performance. Using a sample of facility workers (i.e., building & 
landscape development and maintenance, n = 251) a cross-level model of relationships 
was investigated that links facets of conscientiousness (dependability & achievement) 
and climate (safety & productivity) to facets of performance (safety & speed) via 
regulatory focus (prevention & promotion). Results indicated that both climates and 
personality facets were important predictors of prevention while achievement and 
production climate predicted promotion. In turn prevention positively predicted safety 
and negatively predicted speed while promotion positively predicted speed and 
negatively predicted safety. Most interesting were the findings that prevention carried the 
effects of both climates and conscientiousness facets to safety and speed performance and 
promotion carried the effects of production and achievement to speed and safety 
performance. Results failed to support any cross-level interactions between climate and 
personality in predicting regulatory focus. It appears that regulatory focus is indeed an 
important construct in occupational safety and that both individual and contextual 





Speed and accuracy have been studied by various organizational researchers (e.g., 
Brewer & Ridgeway, 1998; Joseph & Hahn, 1995). However, these studies have 
traditionally relied on either individual differences (e.g., Forster, Higgins, & Bianco, 
2003) or situational variables (e.g., Johnson, 1975) in an effort to predict and explain why 
some people are fast and some are accurate. The same can be said of an analogous 
tradeoff in organizations: the tradeoff between safety and speed. With regard to 
occupational safety, it appears that outcomes are the result of a combination of 
environmental influences (safe or unsafe) and the individual’s choice between a safe 
response and a risky response. The current study is designed to examine the safety/speed 
tradeoff by incorporating both differential psychology (e.g., personality) and situational 
psychology (e.g., climate). Endler (1977), among others (e.g., Cronbach, 1957), has 
explicitly called for such an interactionist perspective and it seems quite fruitful to follow 
his suggestion:   
We need to develop studies based on theory that simultaneously 
incorporate personality and situational variables in their experimental 
designs. We need to make predictions in studies in which we 
simultaneously examine various levels of personality variables in 
conjunction with various situational variables (p. 352).  
 
The current study followed such an approach as it examined the impact of climate 
and personality on individual safety and speed in an organizational setting. More 
specifically, it examined if such relationships are mediated by one’s regulatory focus. 
While recent research has begun to identify several distal predictors of occupational 
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safety (e.g., personality, affect, climate), no study that I am aware of has yet to examine 
the mediating properties of regulatory focus among such distal predictors and outcomes. 
In other words, this study examined if a person’s regulatory focus (i.e., prevention or 
promotion) mediates the relationship between the distal safety antecedents of 
conscientiousness (i.e., duty & achievement facets) and climate (i.e., safety climate & 
productivity climate) and their relationship with occupational safety and productivity. 
More so, it added external validity to the construct of regulatory focus by predicting 
performance (i.e., safety & speed). 
This study appreciably expanded several bodies of literature (e.g., occupational 
safety, self-regulation, climate, personality) by (1) examining an interactional model of 
the safety/speed tradeoff in organizations, (2) examining the mediating and indirect 
effects of regulatory focus with regard to occupational safety and performance, and (3) 
providing additional validity evidence for the construct of regulatory focus by validating 





 Occupational Safety 
Occupational safety is a concern for employees and employers alike. Workplace 
accidents are reported to result in thousands of deaths and permanent disabilities each 
year in the United States, as well as increased accident-related costs. For example, it has 
been estimated by the United States Department of Health and Human Services (1998) 
that 16 workers are killed and 36,000 are injured per working day in the United States. 
These numbers do not include the number of lost work days, restricted work days, or 
employee costs, which are estimated to be over 200 billion dollars. Most staggering is the 
estimate of approximately 250,000 potentially productive years of life and service lost 
each year in the United States to occupational accidents.  Psychologically based health 
issues, such as stress and burnout, have received a great deal of attention in recent years 
by organizational researchers, but occupational safety and related issues have only 
received cursory attention (Zohar, 2003a).  
Human error has traditionally been cited as the number one cause of accidents 
(Dekker, 2002; Slocombe, 1941) and is defined as “the failure of planned actions to 
achieve their desires ends” (Reason, Parker, & Lawton, 1998, p. 292). Human error is a 
catch-all phrase for errors, unsafe behaviors, and accidents that are attributable to a 
person, but does not provide much insight into the behavioral mechanisms that lead to 
unsafe behaviors. Dekker (2002) has eloquently stated that “human error is not an 
explanation for failure, but instead demands an explanation” (p. 372). Furthermore, 
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Reason (1997) has claimed that effective safety measures should focus on much more 
than just the individual (e.g., organizational deficiencies), who is typically at the 
receiving end of much of the trouble. 
Dekker (2002) has recently summarized two views of occupational safety: the old 
view and the new view. The old view is akin to the traditional human error approach that 
relied on the belief that certain individuals are more prone to accidents than others. 
However, this approach failed to identify the accident-prone employee and has virtually 
been dismissed to the point that it is actively discouraged in today’s premiere journals (J. 
Barling, personal communication, January 21, 2003). The new view on the other hand, 
sees human error and unsafe behaviors as symptoms and not direct causes. The new view 
has three tenants to it. First, human error is a symptom of something deeper (e.g., 
personality, work design). Secondly, system safety is not inherent. That is, people have to 
create safety because work systems are not always in concert with the multiple goals that 
employees pursue simultaneously. Lastly, “human error can be systematically connected 
to features of people, tools, tasks, and operating environments” (Dekker, 2002, p. 372).  
This new view of human error suggests that occupational safety research needs to 
begin to address the factors that have previously been swept under the rug of human error 
(e.g., work design, personality, cognition, affect, motivation). The ‘people, tools, tasks, 
and operating environments’ comprising the new view can all be treated as inputs or 
antecedents of occupational safety. That is, each one of these things can be thought of as 
a symptom of occupational safety to varying degrees (Komaki, 1982; Reason, 1997).  
The new view of occupational safety offers a substantial theoretical step forward 
and suggests that an interactional approach might be better suited to predict and explain 
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occupational safety. However, we still know little about the individual regulation of work 
behaviors with regard for occupational safety and how such behaviors might be 
influenced by (1) stable individual differences and (2) contextual and environmental 
factors at work. The current research examined two constructs (i.e., conscientiousness & 
safety climate) that have recently been examined in relation to occupational safety and 
furthermore integrated regulatory focus theory (Higgins, 1997) in an effort to explain the 
relationship between these safety antecedents and safety performance and productivity. 
Again, I am aware of no studies that have attempted to integrate self-regulation theories 
with occupational safety, but such an integration has been called for (e.g., Wallace & 
Chen, 2002; Zohar, 2003a). However, before describing research between safety 
antecedents and safety performance, a discussion of occupational safety criteria was 
warranted as it has been noted that “the criterion, or dependant variable, has long been 
the most neglected element in the modeling of the applied prediction problem” 
(Campbell, 1990, p. 714).  
Performance 
Job Performance. One of the main tenants of Industrial/Organizational (I/O) 
Psychology is the prediction and explanation of human behavior at work. With that said, 
job performance is the primary criterion of interest to I/O Psychologists (Parker & 
Turner, 2002). Individual job performance has been defined as “behaviors enacted by an 
employee that are aimed at meeting organizational goals” (Parker & Turner, 2002, p. 70). 
Behavior and performance are not one in the same: “Behavior is what people do. 
Performance is the expected organizational value of what people do” (Motowidlo, 2003, 
p. 40).  
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Individual job performance has been suggested to be multi-dimensional by several 
researchers (e.g., Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; Motowidlo, 2003; Motowidlo, Borman, & 
Schmit, 1997; Sonnentag & Frese, 2003). Borman and Motowidlo (1993) have suggested 
that job performance contains two distinct domains: task performance and contextual 
performance. The distinction between the two domains is the manner and focus of 
behaviors that support organizational goals. Task performance consists of activities that 
transform raw materials into the goods and services that constitute the organization’s 
product or activities that help maintain the technical core of the organization by 
replenishing the supply of raw materials and distributing finished goods (Borman & 
Motowidlo, 1993; 1997; Motowidlo et al., 1997). Contextual performance, on the other 
hand, consists of those activities that do not directly contribute to the organization’s 
product, but rather promote the broader organizational structure and climate (e.g., social, 
psychological) in which the core functions. More recently, Schmitt et al. (2003) have 
expanded the performance domain to include adaptive performance (London & Mone, 
1999; Pulaskos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000). Adaptive performance is defined 
by Schmitt et al. (2003) “as the proficiency with which employees self-manage novel 
work experiences” (p. 78). They claim that adaptability is a separate dimension of 
performance because it does not fit neatly into either task or contextual performance 
domains.  
Parker and Turner (2002) have also argued for the expansion of the criterion 
space to accommodate the changing nature of work. They stated that individual job 
performance should be renamed to individual work performance to encompass the 
broader context of individual performance that is farther reaching than the two factor 
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structure proposed by Motowidlo and colleagues. They agree with Schmitt et al. (2003) 
and suggested including an adaptive component to the criterion space. However, they go 
further and additionally suggest adding a safety component. Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, and 
Smith-Crowe (2002) have also differentiated safety from other forms of performance in 
their recent paper on general safety performance. They claim that safety is different from 
general job performance (task completion) and demands additional knowledge and skill 
(e.g., personal protection equipment; environmental regulations; safety regulations) in 
order to protect themselves, co-workers, the public, and the environment. To support this 
differentiation, Burke et al. developed and validated a general measure of safety 
performance that was only weakly to moderately correlated with other aspects of 
performance.  
Safety Performance. Numerous studies have been conducted examining the 
antecedents of safety performance as well as more distal outcomes (e.g., accidents, 
micro-accidents). Most of these studies have assessed safety performance using some sort 
of questionnaire developed to assess safe work behaviors. It should be noted that while 
unsafe behaviors may be counterproductive to organizational goals, they should not be 
lumped together with counterproductive behaviors. This is because unsafe acts do not fall 
under traditional operationalizations of counter productive behaviors, which are generally 
considered to be intentional (i.e., withdrawal behaviors, blackmail, sabotage).  
Safety performance should also be distinguished from accidents and injuries. That 
is, performance is an evaluation of behavior, which is distinct from the outcome of the 
behavior. For safety, the outcome is a tangible or a visible thing such as an accident or 
injury, whereas safety performance is the evaluation of behavior relative to safety in the 
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workplace. Thus, the term safety performance should not be inclusive of accidents and 
injuries. Zohar (2000; 2002a), among other (e.g., Wallace & Chen, 2002), have followed 
such a distinction in a few recent papers by treating safety performance as the evaluation 
of safety behavior and accidents as a more distal outcome. Additionally, the pattern of 
correlations between safe behavior (i.e., safety performance) and accidents (i.e., 
outcomes) is relatively moderate at best. (r = -.28 to -.46; Hechanova-Alampay & Beehr, 
2001; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003). However, many authors 
do conclude that unsafe work behaviors tend to lead to accidents.  
Therefore, safety performance can be defined as evaluative “actions or behaviors 
that individuals exhibit in almost all jobs to promote the health and safety of workers, 
clients, the public, and the environment” (Burke et al., 2002, p. 432). Recently, Burke et 
al. (2002) devised a general safety measure and postulated several assumptions regarding 
safety performance. The first assumption is concerned with the scaling and evaluation of 
the measures of safety performance. It is assumed that general safety behaviors can be 
scaled in a manner that allow for the evaluation of the frequency with which workers 
engage in safety related behaviors. Second, safety behaviors are assumed to covary in 
meaningful ways that yield the potential for multiple factors of a higher order safety 
performance construct. A third assumption proposed by Burke et al. suggests that the 
factors of safety performance are distinguishable in terms of their antecedents and in fact 
do covary with other variables of interest differentially (e.g., accidents, illness, restricted 
work days). Thus, it appears that safety performance is also multidimensional. Over two 
studies, Burke et al. (2002) validated a four factor measure of safety performance. The 
four factors consisted of (1) using personal protective equipment (PPE), (2) engaging in 
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workplace practices to reduce risk (PRR), (3) communicating health and safety 
information (CHS), and (4) exercising employee rights and responsibilities (ERR).  
Turner, Parker, and Williams (2002) suggested that safety performance is better 
conceptualized as a two factor model and demonstrated empirical support for this 
assertion. They stated that several studies have consistently found two types of positively 
correlated safety behavior dimensions: (1) safety compliance in task execution and (2) 
safety citizenship behaviors. This is similar to the distinction between task and contextual 
performance, the difference lies in the focus of safety behaviors: the task at hand (follow 
the safety rules) or workplace safety promotion (e.g., making safety suggestions to the 
safety officer).  Safety compliance in task execution is similar to Burke’s et al. (2002) 
dimensions of PPE and PRR, while safety citizenship behaviors are more similar to CHS 
and ERR. Burke et al. acknowledged this overlap, especially between PPE and PRR, but 
stated that the two dimensions should be separated when studying organizations that 
provide extensive safety training (e.g., PPE, safety responsibility, safety communication, 
safe work practices). However, Burke et al. also pointed out that the composite score of 
the general safety performance scale may be more meaningful when used as a higher 
order safety performance factor. The same might be true to arrive at safety behaviors 
during task execution by combining PPE and PRR (i.e., task safety performance) because 
this might be more theoretically relevant to one’s study. For example, if a researcher is 
only interested in safe task execution, the researcher may choose to solely focus on work 
practices or behaviors that reduce risk (i.e., safe work behaviors).  Or if a researcher is 
more concerned with safety communication, he or she should focus on the subscale of 
‘communicating health and safety information’. The current study is more concerned 
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with the tradeoff between safe task execution and speed of task completion and therefore 
will focus on safety behaviors and performance relative to task completion; not safety 
citizenship behaviors.  
Speed-accuracy tradeoffs have been experimentally investigated for quite some 
time with many studies typically showing a negative relationship between the two (e.g,. 
Dickman & Meyer, 1988; Zenger & Fahle, 1997). Forster et al. (2003) found that 
inaccuracy increased as speed increased in several task types. For example, in a drawing 
task (i.e., connecting dots to arrive at a cartoon figure) a correlation of .30 was found 
between inaccuracy and speed.  
However, less attention has been paid to an analogous relationship in 
organizations, the safety-speed tradeoff. Zohar (2000), among others (e.g., Cleveland, 
Cohen, Smith & Cohen, 1978; Planek, Driessen, & Vilardo, 1967), have begun to further 
uncover and discuss the tradeoff between safety and other competing goals in 
organizational settings (e.g., speed of task completion). That is, either safety or 
speed/productivity is stressed by the organization and typically when one is high the 
other is low. For example, Pate-Cornell (1990) found that due to job-evaluation 
procedures emphasizing speed and productivity over safety, workers and managers also 
emphasized productivity and speed over working safely. Pate-Cornell claimed that this 
was the biggest factor responsible for the organization’s poor safety record.  
Munchinsky (1997) has also described such a tradeoff in the coal mining industry. 
He observed miners taking many shortcuts to increase speed. However, many of the 
shortcuts were unsafe. For example, instead of placing electrical cable on elevated hooks 
in the mine to keep them out of harms way, they left them on the mine floor to save time 
 11
and increase productivity. While this did increase productivity, it left a potential lethal 
hazard in the work area. Hence, when work safety becomes contingent on production, 
workers infer a low priority for safety. But this is not a strict one to one relationship 
because safety is inherent to any organization as is productivity. Therefore, when 
production is stressed, employees will still maintain at least a minimal level of safety and 
vice versa. However, employees still experience a great deal of conflict between these 
two priorities and thus the intuitive tradeoff between safety and speed. 
Self Regulation & Regulatory Focus Theory 
Kanfer (1990, 1992), among other (e.g., Chen, Gulley, Whiteman, and Kilcullen; 
2000; Phillips & Gully, 1997), has proposed that distal traits relate to performance and 
outcomes through more proximal state-like individual differences and processes. This 
call has been answered by several researchers. For example, Chen et al. (2000) examined 
the relationship of several distal individual differences (i.e., cognitive ability, general 
self-efficacy, & goal orientation) and their relationship to more proximal individual 
differences (i.e., specific self-efficacy, state anxiety) in predicting academic performance. 
Results demonstrated the expected pattern of relationships in that the proximal constructs 
tended to mediate the relationships between distal individual differences and 
performance. Phillips and Gully (1997) found a similar relationship in that self-efficacy 
and self-set goals (i.e., proximal constructs) mediated the relationship between cognitive 
ability, goal orientation, and locus of control (i.e., distal constructs) and performance. 
Barrick and his colleagues found that the relationship between the personality (i.e., FFM) 
and performance is mediated by several constructs such as one’s striving orientation (i.e., 
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status, accomplishment, communion; Barrick, Stewart, & Piowtrowski, 2002) and goal 
setting and goal commitment (Barrick, Mount, & Strauss, 1993).   
Meta-analytic results have also tended to support this distal – proximal – 
performance relationship. For example, Chen, Casper, and Cortina (2001) found that self-
efficacy mediated the relationship between cognitive ability and performance as well as 
the relationship between conscientiousness and performance. However, this relationship 
only held when the task was simple, not complex. Thus, Kanfer’s (1990, 1992) 
suggestion has been well supported in many areas (e.g., academic performance, job 
performance), but has not been thoroughly investigated in the occupational safety 
domain. 
By applying this ‘mediation by process’ framework to occupational safety, 
researchers may gain insight into the regulatory processes linking distal safety 
antecedents (e.g., personality, climate) to performance and outcomes. Process models 
appear to provide clues beyond the simple one-to-one relationship (e.g., 
conscientiousness to performance). They attempt to uncover a person’s underlying 
qualities such as goals, motives, and foci that are manifested differently across situations 
(Mischel & Shoda, 1995). That is, while one’s stable disposition predisposes a person to 
behave in a specified manner, the person’s situation or environment might create 
variability in an otherwise stable behavior pattern (i.e., person*situation interaction). To 
highlight, the trait of conscientiousness is represented by a stable pattern of behaviors, 
but these behaviors might fluctuate based on one’s environment. At work a person might 
be organized, hardworking, and generally meets task demands, whereas another person 
might follow such a behavior pattern at home (Feldman, 1999). Even at work, the 
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individual’s behavior might fluctuate based on the external stimuli one is confronted 
with. For example, if an employee generally strives to complete tasks in a safe manner, 
but the supervisor stresses the speed of task completion it is possible that under such 
conditions the employee’s behavior will be less safe than in other situations (e.g., 
supervisor stresses safety; Pervin, 1989).  
Process models allow a researcher to better determine if stable predispositions are 
acted on in a specific environment or situation (e.g., work). Therefore, one could put 
forth an argument suggesting that distal individual differences and contextual variables 
influence decisions to engage safety activities (e.g., working safely or not) and these 
decisions to engage in safety activities can be influenced, positively or negatively, 
through various proximal regulatory processes and states (cf. Kanfer & Ackerman, 1996; 
Kanfer & Heggested, 1997; Wallace & Chen, 2002). Furthermore, it is possible that 
person-by-situation interactions better capture one’s behavior in a specific context such 
as work (cf. Mischel, 1968).   
 Regulatory focus theory (RFT; Higgins, 1997) might be useful as a framework for 
investigating this theoretically interesting proposition. People are motivated to approach 
desired outcomes, but means to reaching the desired outcomes differ across people based 
on the focus or strategic concern one might possess. Regulatory focus theory delineates 
between two forms of goal pursuit that vary in the focus of regulatory activities: (1) 
promotion focus (i.e., focus on desired outcome of accomplishments & gains) and (2) 
prevention focus (i.e., focus on desired outcome of safety & responsibility). Higgins 
(1997) and Forster et al. (2003) have proposed that regulatory focus is a strategic 
tendency or concern that influences how persons approach and strive for desired 
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outcomes. A strategic concern or strategy “refers to a pattern of decisions in the 
acquisition, retention, and utilization of information that serves to meet certain objectives 
(i.e., to insure certain forms of outcome and to insure against others”; Bruner, Goodnow, 
& Austin, 1956, p. 54). Therefore, regulatory focus is a cognitively based focus that 
drives behaviors towards desired outcomes and away from undesired outcomes. Thus, in 
the larger approach and avoid domain, RFT has been suggested to reside in the approach 
domain (Higgins, Rooney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). That is, both promotion and 
prevention strategies allow one to reduce discrepancies, but use different means to reduce 
discrepancies between the current state and the desired end state or goal. Thus, different 
approach (promotion) and avoidance strategies (prevention) can be employed in the 
service of the same general approach system.  
 While RFT appears to be similar to other motivational and regulatory theories 
such as goal orientation (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Vandewalle, 
1997) it differs from these theories because the focus of RFT is on obtaining desired 
outcomes; not how or if they approach or avoid the goal all together. Any goal can be 
pursued with either a promotion or prevention strategy and therefore Higgins (1997) and 
Forster et al. (2002) have concluded that regulatory focus is independent of goal 
orientation. For example, a task performance goal could either be represented as a 
responsibility thereby creating a prevention focus (e.g., make sure this is done correctly) 
or represented as an accomplishment by creating a promotion focus (e.g., I would like to 
complete this). Empirical support for this assertion has been lacking until now. In a pilot 
study designed to develop and validate measures for this dissertation, a work oriented 
measure of regulatory focus was developed. Results demonstrated that regulatory focus is 
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distinct from goal orientation. For complete results of this pilot study please see 
Appendix A.  
 A person with a promotion focus strategy tends to strategically match behavior to 
a goal or standard by focusing on attaining a positive outcome without regard for possible 
negative consequences. That is, “individuals in a promotion focus, who are strategically 
inclined to approach matches to desired end-states, should be eager to attain advancement 
and gains” (Higgins, 1997, p. 1285) and are careful to not make any errors of omission 
(i.e., lack of accomplishments). Additionally, in a promotion focus environment persons 
experience pleasure when rewarded or praised for their accomplishments and experience 
pain when not praised for their accomplishments. In short, those employing a promotion 
focus are concerned with the attainment of aspirations and accomplishments by 
increasing the salience of positive outcomes and gains.  
On the other hand, a person employing a prevention strategy strategically avoids 
behaviors that mismatch a goal or standard that might prevent the person from reaching 
the desired outcome (Higgins, 1997). Specifically, “individuals in a prevention focus, 
who are strategically inclined to avoid mismatches to desired end-states, should be 
vigilant to ensure safety and non-losses” (p. 1285). That is, they try to make sure they do 
not have any errors of commission (i.e., making a mistake) by increasing the salience of 
possible obstacles in an attempt to avoid negative outcomes (e.g., acting safe to avoid 
injury/mistakes) during task completion. Such a strategy is sensitive to the presence or 
absence of negative outcomes. The negative outcome is the focus here; not the positive as 
is the case with promotion focus. Employees in prevention focus environments 
experience pleasure when employers train employees new safety techniques and 
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preventative measures (Forster et al., 2003). These employees experience pain when they 
are punished for making mistakes or are careless. In essence, those employing a 
prevention focus are concerned with the attainment of responsibility and safety in task 
completion by increasing the salience of negative outcomes and consequences. 
One’s regulatory focus (i.e., prevention or promotion) is determined by at least 
three antecedents: needs, values, and situational framing (Higgins, 1997). RFT and its 
two dimensions can be traced to extant needs theories. Bowlby (1969) claimed that there 
are two fundamental regulatory needs that underlie goal directed action: nurturance (i.e., 
self-actualization) and security (i.e., safety). Recently Kluger, Yaniv, and Kuhberger 
(1999) reviewed RFT in relation to these theories. They gave particular consideration to 
empirical tests of Needs Theory (Maslow, 1965; Ronen, 1994), Values Theory 
(Schwartz, 1992), and Job Interests Theory (Holland, 1985) and found that all theories 
yielded a two-dimensional space. One dimension consists of safety needs, security 
values, and conventional job interests, while the other dimension consists of self-
actualization, self-direction, and artistic/investigative interest. Kluger et al. (1999) 
concluded that Higgin’s (1997) RFT reflects this differentiation and are considered 
precursors in his theory. That is, self-actualization leads to a promotion focus and 
security and safety needs and values leads to a prevention focus.  
Strong obligations and ideals also influence one’s regulatory focus (Higgins, 
1997; Kluger, et al., 1999). If a person holds values consistent with one’s ought self he or 
she tends to value duty and responsibility. Self-regulation of one’s ought self represents a 
person’s duties, responsibilities, and/or safety needs which lead to a prevention focus. If a 
person holds ideal values, he or she desires to be all that he or she can be. One’s ideal self 
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involves regulatory activities that promote one’s hopes, desires, and aspirations to meet 
nurturance needs, thus leading to a promotion focus. Lastly, the manner in which a 
situation is framed can also influence a regulatory focus. If a situation is framed in terms 
of gains and non-gains, a promotion focus is more likely to emerge because the situation 
is framed in terms of achievement and accomplishments (e.g., production). If a situation 
is framed in terms of losses and non-losses, a prevention strategy is likely to emerge 
because the situation is framed in terms of avoiding failure or harm (e.g., complete task 
safely).  
In summary, there are three antecedents that determine a person’s regulatory 
focus. A promotion focus is triggered by nurturance needs, strong ideals, and situational 
framing of gains vs. non-gains. A prevention focus is triggered by security and safety 
needs, strong obligations, and situational framing of losses vs. non-losses. Figure 1 











gain Situations Sensitivity to presence or absence of 
positive outcomes 
Approach as a strategic means 
Insure hits and insure against errors 
of omission 







Non-loss - loss 
Situations Sensitivity to Absence or presence 
of  negative outcomes 
Avoidance as a strategic means 
Insure correct rejections and insure 
against errors of commission 
Quiescence – Agitation Emotions 
Figure 1. Regulatory Focus Theory: Prevention and Promotion 
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While it might sound like these two strategies are merely two sides of the same 
coin, Higgins (1997) has proposed that they actually have different cognitive patterns and 
different behavioral and emotional outcomes. Overall performance of a task is influenced 
by the operation of a mixture of prevention and promotion with individuals more prone to 
one focus than the other (Higgins, 1997). However, at any given moment during task 
execution the activation of one system (i.e., prevention or promotion) is likely to 
minimize the other. To highlight, take the common delivery driver as an example. A 
delivery driver desires to quickly and safely deliver a package. While driving the delivery 
truck the employee might employ a promotion focus (e.g., I know this path & can get 
their fast) but external stimuli (e.g., road construction) might facilitate a change of focus 
(e.g., better be careful, not sure about this). Therefore, it is believed that promotion and 
prevention are not contradictory to one another, but rather operate as separate systems. 
Higgins et al. (2001) have supported this assertion by finding essentially no correlation 
(e.g., r = -.007) between the two foci when using the Regulatory Focus Questionnaire, a 
measure of one’s stable tendency to employ a prevention or promotion focus across 
situations. Additional evidence was provided in the pilot study for this dissertation 
regarding the development of a new measure of regulatory focus.  
By integrating regulatory focus theory with occupational safety, researchers could 
also begin to explain some of the relationships that have been reported in the literature 
between individual differences, contextual variables, and occupational safety. One’s 
regulatory focus has been conceptualized as either a “choric individual difference or an 
experimental variable manipulated by framing” (Forster et al., 2003). Higgins (1997) and 
colleagues (e.g., Forster et al., 2003) have argued that one’s regulatory focus generally 
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predisposes a person to engage a certain strategy (i.e., promotion or prevention), but it 
does not necessarily determine the course of action one will always take. As noted above, 
sometimes situational or contextual variables influence this choice. For example, 
employer-employee interactions can chronically emphasize certain behaviors in pursuit 
of goals that reflect either promotion focus or prevention focus. This creates a stable 
work environment that is either promotion or prevention focused, but this stable 
environment can fluctuate based on other contextual variables. For example, leadership 
or climate can infer a regulatory focus by communication of gain/non-gain information 
(i.e., promotion focus) or by communicating loss/non-loss information (i.e., prevention 
focus). The focus of the information is positive (i.e., we have gained) or negative (we 
have lost). Such a switch of focus can be seen by many persons in many organizational 
settings. For example, when production falls behind, supervisors may communicate to 
their subordinates that they need to work faster and produce more (creating promotion 
focus) and sometimes even encourage unsafe behaviors (destroying prevention focus) to 
increase productivity. Likewise, supervisors might momentarily create a prevention focus 
when new technologies are introduced in the work environment (be careful, this is new). 
Therefore, one might treat regulatory focus as more proximal to safety performance and 
safety outcomes than more stable individual differences such as personality or 
organizationally based constructs such as climate.  
At this point, there has been no empirical work conducted that examines RFT 
with occupational safety with the exception of the pilot study conducted for this 
dissertation. However, the theory seems to beckon this integration as it appears to tackle 
the speed/safety tradeoff. For example, one employing a promotion focus might act 
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unsafe in pursuit of goals due to their achievement emphasis, but this person’s action may 
not always (if ever) result in an accident as he or she might have figured out what he or 
she can get away with. This could actually increase the persons’ accomplishments by 
increasing the efficiency or speed with which the person completes the task. However, it 
could reduce output if the person is injured therefore reducing the person’s effectiveness. 
Likewise, if a person is prevention focused, he or she actively tries to avoid acting in an 
unsafe manner, thereby reducing the chances of being involved in an accident and 
ensuring task completion. In the short term this might reduce output due to the person 
working more vigilantly (i.e., slower), but increase effectiveness in the long run because 
the person is less likely to be involved in an accident (Forster et al., 2003; Wallace & 
Vodanovich, 2003). Results of the pilot study tend to support these expectations, but they 
need to be tested in a more rigorous setting. Additionally, the begging question remains: 
how can we maximize both speed of task completion and safe task execution?  
Forster et al. (2003) have provided us an empirical glimpse at this relationship in 
that they found promotion focus individuals completed laboratory tasks much faster, but 
less accurate than prevention focused persons. Additionally, they found that as the goal 
approaches (i.e., goal looms larger phenomenon) promotion focused persons mistakes 
increased dramatically with increased speed, where as prevention focused persons 
mistakes decreased significantly with decreased speed. However and most interesting to 
the current study, they found that when tasks are relatively easy, speed and accuracy 
positively related to each other. This suggests that persons can maximize speed and safety 
for easy and routine job tasks. Based on this, Forster et al. (2003) stated that “employers 
can decide how to frame a task for their employees. For example, if the task is easy, 
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framing in terms of gains and non-gains [promotion focus] might work better than 
framing in terms of losses and non-losses [prevention focus]. However, if the task is 
difficult and if accuracy is crucial, then loss and non-loss framing would be more 
effective” (p. 15). This might generalize to job types as well. For those jobs that are 
relatively easy and routine, an organization or employer may gain more if they frame the 
job in promotion terms (i.e., gains & non-gains) because safety and accuracy may not be 
an overriding concern. Whereas, for those jobs that are complex and dynamic, employers 
might gain more if they frame the job in prevention terms (i.e., losses & non-losses). 
It is possible that research in the occupational safety domain could greatly benefit 
from examining differences in regulatory focus. For example, in organizations that have 
safety issues (i.e., high number of accidents) it might be possible to improve safety by 
training leaders and supervisors to communicate safety procedures and increase the 
salience of possible negative outcomes; thereby framing the situation to produce a 
prevention focus via climate.  In organizational settings, perhaps it is climate that acts as 
the framing tool for situational regulatory focus. For example, Zohar (2002b) conducted a 
study that found safety improved when leaders were made aware of safety issues and 
communicated these issues to subordinates. However, he did not examine if this created a 
regulatory style of prevention. Perhaps this was the regulatory mechanism that partially 
transformed unsafe behaviors to safe behaviors by focusing resources towards the goal of 
safe task execution rather than simply task completion. It is also possible that certain 
individual characteristics might be selected for that create a desired focus. For example, 
persons that are organized and tend to follow standard operating procedures might act 
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safer than those that are unorganized and sloppy. Such possibilities will be discussed 
below in more detail.  
Distal Antecedents: Conscientiousness & Climate 
Occupational safety has been a constant topic of study for organizational 
researchers for well over 100 years. A number of antecedents have been linked to 
occupational safety (i.e., safety performance & accidents) including dispositional affect 
(Iverson and Erwin, 1997), boredom (Frone, 1998; Mackworth, 1948), tenure (Frone, 
1998; Hansen, 1989; Liao, Arvey, Butler, & Nutting, 2001), cognitive failure (Larson and 
Merritt, 1992; Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003b), and personality (Fallon, Avis, Kudisch, 
Gornet, & Frost, 2000; Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003b) as well as organizational or 
contextual variables such as climate (Hofmann & Stetzor, 1996; Zohar, 2000, 2002a) and 
leadership (Zohar, 2002b). Recently, two constructs have begun to receive more attention 
in the literature with regard to occupational safety: conscientiousness and safety climate. 
The following sections will review this work and integrate these constructs with 
regulatory focus theory in an effort to explain the distal relationships that have been 
found among conscientiousness and safety climate and occupational safety.  
Conscientiousness. 
 Personality has recently received a lot of attention due to empirical findings 
suggesting personality can predict job performance (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Salgado, 
1997). Recently, a great deal of research has focused on the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of 
personality. The FFM consists of Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, Extroversion, 
Openness to Experience, and Neuroticism (Costa & McRae, 1992; Goldberg, 1992) and 
represents the most basic personality taxonomy (Hough & Schneider, 1996). A host of 
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researchers have employed the FFM in investigations into personality and work 
performance relationships (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hurtz, & Donovan, 2000; Judge, 
Martocchio, & Thoresen, 1997; Salgado, 1997) and in particular, conscientiousness has 
been shown to predict job performance in studies across a variety of occupations and 
occupational levels (Stewart, 1999), including meta-analytic studies (e.g., Barrick & 
Mount, 1991; Salgado, 1997). A conscientious person is believed to possess qualities that 
reflect dependability (e.g., thorough, careful, organized, responsible) as well as volitional 
constructs such as need for achievement (Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hough, 1992, Moon 
2001). Thus, it is assumed that conscientiousness relates to internal motivational 
processes and therefore more conscientiousness persons perform better as they have 
higher levels of work motivation (Schmidt & Hunter, 1992; Stewart, 1999). Even with 
the overwhelming support for the relationship between conscientiousness and 
performance, limited research has been conducted examining the relationship between 
occupational safety and conscientiousness. This is quite surprising because conscientious 
persons should behave more safely at work due to the characteristics they possess and 
exhibit. Recent empirical work has begun to show initial promise for such a relationship, 
but more research is needed to verify this relationship as well as examine the relationship 
that facets of conscientiousness might share with occupational safety.  
In a study conducted by Fallon et al. (2000) the relationship between 
conscientiousness and counterproductive work behaviors (i.e., integrity, safety, rehire 
rate, attendance) was examined. They did not find a significant relationship between 
conscientiousness, or any facets of conscientiousness (e.g., orderliness, dependability) 
and safety. It should be noted that the measure of safety performance was lumped 
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together with ratings of integrity and this most certainly compromised the measurement 
of workplace safety. A more recent study reported a significant negative relationship 
between accidents and conscientiousness (r = -.16; Cellar, Nelson, Yorke, & Bauer 
2001). Arthur and Graziano (1996) found a significant, negative relationship between 
conscientiousness and being involved in driving accidents. Unlike Cellar et al. (2001), 
Arthur and Graziano (1996) used both undergraduates and employees from a temporary 
employment service. More recently, Arthur and Doverspike (2001) confirmed this 
negative relationship between conscientiousness and driving accidents. In an effort to 
overcome these conflicting results, Wallace and Vodanovich (2003b) conducted two 
separate studies using two diverse samples to more closely examine the relationship 
conscientiousness shares with occupational safety. Over these two studies it was found 
that conscientiousness significantly and negatively related to unsafe work behaviors and 
workplace accidents (average r = -.30 for unsafe behaviors & average r = -.16 for 
accidents). 
The empirical evidence tends to show a weak to moderate negative relationship 
between conscientiousness and workplace safety, but the relationships among workplace 
safety and the more specific facets of conscientiousness are unclear at this point. 
Stemming from the larger debate of bandwidth or fidelity, researchers have debated the 
utility of conscientiousness facets for years (e.g., Hough, 1992, 1997; Ones, Viswesvaran, 
& Schmidt, 1993; Schmidt & Hunter, 1992). However, recent evidence has tended to 
support the use of conscientiousness facets (e.g., Moon, 2001; Stewart, 1999). This 
debates stems largely from the confusion surrounding the construct itself. Barrick and 
Mount (1991) pointed out this confusion in that some researchers refer to 
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conscientiousness as reflecting dependability (e.g., careful, planned, organized) while 
others refer to it’s achievement properties (e.g., striving, persistent). In essence the trait of 
conscientiousness encompasses both achievement and dependability, which of course are 
positively related to each other (r ≈ .4-.5) and can be considered general approach traits 
(Goldberg, 1999; Moon, 2001; Stewart, 1999). 
Achievement. Researchers (e.g., Costa and McRae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; 
Hough, 1992) have labeled a subtrait of conscientiousness as achievement and this is 
closely aligned with the volitional component of conscientiousness (Stewart, 1999). 
Persons reflecting this personality subtrait are described as hardworking, persistent and 
eager to achieve goals whether or not goals are self-set or assigned (Hollenbeck, 
Williams, & Klein, 1989). More specifically, the “achievement/work-oriented person 
works hard, sets high standards, tries to do a good job, endorses the work ethic, and 
concentrates on, and persists in, completion of the task at hand” (Hough, 1992, p. 144). 
The volitional aspect of conscientiousness has been shown to predict job performance in 
several studies (e.g., Hough, 1992) especially when employees are in a maintenance stage 
(i.e., can perform all major job tasks; Stewart, 1999). Moon (2001) found that 
achievement positively predicted one’s escalating level of commitment. That is, those 
persons that scored high on achievement tended to keep investing resources even in the 
face of failure in order to save face because it is believed that these individuals are self-
interested. However, he found a negative relationship between duty (dependability) and 
commitment levels. 
While achievement is generally desired in most performance domains, it might 
lead to employees acting more unsafe in certain situations. For example, if  a person is 
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concerned about achieving more and more in less and less time, he or she may engage in 
more unsafe behaviors (e.g., short-cuts) and thus endangering themselves and others. 
This might be due to such individuals utilizing a promotion focus.  
Nurturance and self-actualization needs have been suggested to lead to a 
promotion focus by striving to reach one’s ideal self (Higgins, 1997; Kluger et al., 1999). 
The achievement facet conscientiousness captures one’s stable tendency to strive for 
more and more and possibly for nurturance needs and one’s ideal self (e.g., persistent to 
achieve high standards). Therefore, it appears that the conscientiousness facet of 
achievement might be a strong predictor of a promotion focus due to the construct’s 
operationalization capturing related needs and values (nurturance, ideals).  
Dependability. Hough (1992) defined a dependable person as one who is 
“disciplined, well organized, planful, respectful of laws and regulations, honest, 
trustworthy, wholesome, and accepting authority” (p. 144). Additionally, such a person 
“prefers order and thinks before acting” (p. 144). Ashton (1998) found that duty 
negatively related work place deviance. Dependability (duty) has been shown to relate to 
one’s desire to follow regulations (Hough, 1992) and this is especially important for 
dangerous work environments in which short-cuts and procedure violations can endanger 
employees’ safety as highly dependable persons are methodical and practice effective 
time management (Moon, 2001; Stewart, 1999). This might be especially important when 
safety is an issue because it might enable employees to plan effectively to complete tasks 
more accurately and safely in a specified amount of time. Thus, it might be that these 
individuals utilize a prevention focus when engaging tasks. 
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Dependability is also desired in organizations. One who is duty driven is well 
organized and disciplined. Such duty might lead to goal striving that is ‘by the book’ and 
ultimately lead to task engagement and completion in a safer manner. For example, if a 
person is concerned about doing things the right way, he or she may engage in more safe 
behaviors and thus keeping themselves and others safe (at least from things under their 
control). This might be due to such individuals utilizing a prevention focus.  
Safety and security needs and responsibility values (oughts) have theoretically 
been linked to a prevention focus (Higgins, 1997; Kluger et al., 1999). The 
conscientiousness facet of dependability captures one’s stable tendency to strive for goals 
by following rules and regulations (e.g., duties, responsibilities). Therefore, it appears 
that the conscientiousness facet of dependability might be a strong predictor of a 
prevention focus due to the construct’s operationalizations capturing related needs 
(safety) and obligations (responsibility).   
Therefore, it is possible that these two facets of conscientiousness relate to 
occupational safety and work speed differently due to the strategic tendency or regulatory 
focus one tends to utilize in such settings. That is, those that are more dependable and 
dutiful may act more safely by utilizing a prevention focus than those that are concerned 
with achieving due to their utilization of a promotion focus. This idea will be revisited in 
Chapter 3.  
Climate 
Recently there has been a push to examine relationships at and across multiple 
levels of analysis (e.g., Chen & Bliese, 2002; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) and this trend 
has continued into the occupational safety domain with several recent studies being 
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published examining organizational and group influences on individual safety (e.g., 
Hofmann & Stetzor, 1996; Zohar, 2000, 2002a). Safety research has begun to examine a 
more social or organizationally based construct and its impact on occupational safety. 
The construct is safety climate.  
Organizational climate and culture are cognate sets of characteristics such as 
attitudes, values, and practices of members of an organization or social unit (Zohar, 
2003a). Climate is distinct from, but related to, organization culture. Climate refers to the 
shared perceptions among members of an organization with regard to policies, 
procedures, and practices. In other words, climate is an “experientially based description 
of what people see and report happening to them in an organizational situation” (Ostroff, 
Kinicki, & Tamkins, 2003). Climate can be conceptualized at both the individual level 
(e.g., Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002) and the group or unit level (e.g., Hofmann & 
Stetzer, 1996). Taken at the individual level, climate is assessed via individual level 
perceptions of climate (Barling et al., 2002) and taken at the group level, climate is the 
sharedness of such perceptions commonly operationalized under a specific leader, 
supervisor, or group (Zohar, 2002b). James, Hater, Gent and Bruni (1978) termed the 
individual level climate perception as psychological climate and defined it as “the 
individual’s cognitive representations of relatively proximal situational conditions, 
expressed in terms that reflect psychologically meaningful interpretations of the 
situation” (p. 786).  
Culture is broader and subsumes the policies, procedures, conditions, 
representations, and practices as it has its roots in the history of the society and 
organization, which in turn is more stable and resistant to change than climate (Ostroff et 
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al., 2003). Culture pertains to fundamental beliefs shared by employees, which are 
interpreted in various symbolic manners to understand organizational events and artifacts 
(Hatch, 1993).   
Safety climate “relates to shared perceptions with regard to safety policies 
procedures, and practices” (Zohar, 2002b, p. 125). Safety climate is more narrowly 
defined and specific to the group or departmental level of analysis and not the 
organization as a whole (Cooper, 2000). Zohar (2002b) describes safety climate in terms 
of two independent parameters: (1) strength and (2) level. Strength of climate refers to 
the sharedness of beliefs regarding safety and varies from weak to strong. Level of 
climate, on the other hand, refers to the mean of climate on a continuum of relevant 
climate scores and varies from low to high. Zohar (2003a) distinguishes these terms by 
stating: 
…high safety climate relates to supportive policies concerning safety and 
health, though such a climate may be strong or weak, depending on the 
extent of agreement among employees in their respective organizations or 
subunits (p. 125). 
 
An additional distinction is necessary to more fully understand safety climate and 
that distinction rests in the formality of the polices, procedures, and practices of safety in 
a unit of analysis. Formal policies and procedures are explicit, but are usually quite 
different from enforced (i.e., informal) practices. Employees usually follow the enacted or 
policy-in-action practices required by supervisors and not the formal policies, procedures, 
and practices requested by the organization as a whole. Hackman (1992) has discussed 
this issue in terms of ambient stimuli. Ambient stimuli are part of the background of team 
or group functioning. It cues group members to appropriate and inappropriate behaviors 
for the group. Over time, this helps to create group norms that partially direct group 
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members’ focus and behavior to safety or productivity. In a high and strong safety 
climate, it is possible that there is a great deal of ambient stimuli for behaving safely and 
employees act on such stimuli. Thus, safety climate needs to be assessed in the functional 
role rather than the formal role. The same can be said for other climate facets as well (e.g., 
production climate). Most laypersons are aware of such distinctions, but an example 
would highlight this distinction. Almost every organization will stress safety in formal 
declarations such as ‘safety first’, but when production falls behind, safety is no longer 
first as supervisors tend to encourage employees to bend the rules a bit to increase 
production. In turn, this might reduce the safety climate. This can result in a strong (i.e., 
high agreement), but low (i.e., low mean) safety climate. Enforced safety policies, 
procedures, and practices reflect the relative priorities of the unit of analysis regarding 
safety and might fluctuate based on productivity.  
Empirical work on safety climate began to receive attention with the seminal 
work of Zohar (1980) in which he operationalized safety climate and validated a measure 
of safety climate that predicted the effectiveness of a safety program. Empirical studies of 
safety climate and its relationship with occupational safety began to take off in the 
1990’s. Studies have examined both individual level perceptions of safety climate (e.g., 
Barling et al., 2002; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Thompson, Hilton, & Witt, 1998) as well as 
aggregate level relationships (e.g., Hofmann & Morgeson, 2003; Hofmann & Stetzer, 
1996; Zohar, 2000). At the individual level a great deal of support has been gained for the 
relationship between psychological safety climate and accidents (e.g., Gillen, Baltz, 
Gassel, Kirsch, & Vaccaro, 2002; Thompson et al., 1998; Thomas, Melia, and 
Oliver;1999; Varonene & Mattila, 2000). Griffin and Neal (2000) found that the higher 
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order factor of safety climate, as assessed by managements’ values, safety inspections, 
personnel, training, and safety communication, predicted safety knowledge that in turn 
predicted both safety compliance and safety participation in a sample of manufacturing 
and mining personnel. Barling, et al. (2002) also found that psychological safety climate 
perceptions related to workplace injuries. More specifically, they found that leadership, 
role overload, and safety consciousness all predicted safety climate, which in turn 
predicted workplace injuries over two studies. 
However, these studies may have fallaciously reached these results by not 
examining the hierarchical nature of safety climate. That is, when using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) on hierarchical or nested data the assumption of independence might be 
violated. The possibility of this violation needs to be assessed. That is, safety climate is 
largely dependant on the specific work environment one occupies and this possibly 
creates a clustering effect. Additionally, the construct of safety climate is defined as a 
shared perception and the degree of sharedness needs to be assessed. If there is evidence 
to aggregate (e.g., rwg ≥  .70) and if this is ignored then one might violate the assumption 
of independence. Perhaps these researchers were only concerned with psychological 
climate as discussed by and James and Jones (1974), but did not explicitly state this if 
this was the case. Such assessment techniques allow for clarity when assessing climate 
relationships and few studies have assessed this (cf. Zohar 2002a). Some studies have set 
out to assess group level safety climate, but failed to meet the prerequisites of 
aggregation (e.g., Zohar, 2002b), but many others have successfully met the prerequisites 
and aggregated to examine cross-level relationships.  
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For example, Hofmann and Stetzer’s (1996) paper was one of the first to examine 
the cross-level effects of safety climate on the commission of unsafe behaviors in the 
workplace. They found that safety climate negatively related to unsafe behaviors in the 
workplace and workplace accidents (raw & transformed accidents). Zohar (2000), in part, 
replicated the findings of Hofmann and Stetzer (1996). In this study Zohar 
operationalized safety climate based solely on the supervisor and found two factors 
comprising this construct: supervisor action (i.e., positive and negative feedback 
regarding safety) and supervisor expectation (i.e., safety vs. productivity). At the group 
level of analysis, it was found that both action and expectation significantly predicted 
microaccidents (i.e., minor injuries requiring basic medical attention), but when 
examining the cross-level effects of safety climate on microaccidents, only action was 
found to be a significant predictor.    
“Safety in industry is above all a responsibility of management, and unless 
understood other measures will not be successful in abolishing accidents and injuries” 
(Griffiths, 1985, p. 61).  We are beginning to understand that managers create climate (cf. 
Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939), but we do not yet understand how climate might 
influence individual behavior regarding safety. It might be that those that create a strong 
and high safety climate frame situations as preventative (non-loss vs. loss) to insure 
security and safety that in turn guides employees to act safer. However, it could be that if 
a situation if framed in terms of gains and non-gains (i.e., production oriented climate) a 
promotion focus develops and employees strive to complete tasks in less and less time. 
This again highlights the competing goals of safety and productivity discussed by Zohar 
(2000; 2002). Thus, it might be more beneficial to examine two facets of climate, safety 
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climate and production climate, and how each shape’s a person’s regulatory focus due to 
such competing goals (i.e., produce or be safe). Similarly to safety climate, production 
climate can be operationalized as the enforced production policies, procedures, and 
practices that reflect the relative priorities of the group regarding speed of task 
completion. A production climate and a safety climate are at odds with each because 
when one is emphasized, the other is typically minimized; thus these two competing 
climates are likely to negatively relate to each other (cf. Pate-Cornell, 1990; Zohar, 
2000). It would appear that a high and strong safety climate would lead to a focus on 
prevention and a high and strong production climate would lead to a focus on promotion. 
Pilot data has tended to support this assumption as well as the negative relationship 
between the two competing climates.  
Climate and Leadership Behaviors. The discussion of climate above suggests that 
climate is operationalized based on supervisor practices and policies. While this 
intuitively seems quite similar to leadership behaviors, Zohar (2000) has stated that the 
two are “qualitatively different constructs, relating to independent dimensions of 
behavior” (p. 590). Leadership behaviors are more stable across situations whereas 
climate perceptions are more malleable due to the relative emphasis or priority placed on 
competing job demands (i.e., be safe, be fast). Empirical work has tended to support these 
differences. For example, Zohar (2002b) found that certain leadership styles positively 
related to safety climate (e.g., transformational) while others displayed null or negative 
relationships with safety climate (e.g., laissez-faire). Additionally, in the pilot study 
reported in the appendix of the current dissertation, I found that safety positively related 
to leadership styles of consideration and initiating task structure, but production only 
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negatively related to consideration. Thus, Zohar’s (2000) assertion that the two constructs 




THE CURRENT INVESTIGATION 
 
The hypothesized theoretical model of relationships is presented in Figure 21. 
Building upon extant theory, the hypothesized model of relationships attempts to capture 
the regulating foci that might transmit distal antecedents to occupational outcomes. That 
is, previous studies have found that the distal personality trait of conscientiousness 
predicts safety performance as does safety climate, but research has tended to overlook 
the regulatory processes and strategies that might link these distal traits and contextual 
variables to safety performance (i.e., task safety performance) and speed of task 
completion. In the following sections, the rationale for these relationships will be 
described in more detail.
                                                 
1 It should be noted that this is only a theoretical model and not a model to be tested; rather the 





































Predictors of Regulatory Focus 
To reiterate, persons with a promotion focus try to match behaviors with a goal or 
standard by focusing on attaining a positive outcome without considering negative 
consequences (cf. Higgins, 1997). This type of regulatory focus tends to create a bias of 
saying ‘yes’. In other words they have a ‘risky bias’ and tend to act before thinking 
(Forster et al., 2003). Persons that have a high need for achievement also tend to behave 
more risky in hopes of achieving more and more in less and less time. Such a high 
tendency for achievement leads employees to strive for continual improvement (Hough, 
1992). This is similar to the precursors of promotion focus (i.e., ideal self, nurturance 
needs, & gain – non gain) in that persons trying to reach their ideal self and meet self-
actualization needs continuously strive for more. Such a high level of striving may create 
a regulatory style that is focused only on the aspects of the job or task that are necessary 
to accomplish it as fast as possible. That is, such persons may devote resources to 
accomplishing the task as fast as possible, but fail to devote resources to ensure one’s 
safety. With that said, it appears that those with a high need for achievement utilize a 
regulatory style that is focused on promotion, not prevention. Thus, it was expected that 
achievement, which is theoretically similar to the antecedents of promotion (i.e., 
nurturance needs, strong ideals, & gains), would positively relate to a promotion focus 
regulatory style and negatively relate to a prevention focus.   
 H1: The Achievement facet of Conscientiousness will positively relate to a 
Promotion Focus 
 H2: The Achievement facet of Conscientiousness will negatively relate to 
a Prevention Focus 
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Those concerned with safety, responsibility, and dependability have been 
suggested to have a regulatory focus of prevention (Higgins, 1997). A person employing 
a prevention strategy actively tries to avoid making any errors of commission to maintain 
one’s ought self (duties, responsibilities, safety needs). They complete tasks more 
vigilantly as they are concerned with avoiding negative outcomes during task completion. 
This type of strategy produces an inclination to say ‘no’, or rather produces a 
‘conservative bias’ (Forster et al., 2003). Such a regulatory style may produce a more 
conservative allocation of resources and thereby devote an adequate amount of resources 
towards safety. The Conscientiousness facet of dependability is also more conservative. 
According to Hough (1992) those reflecting dependability prefer order in their lives and 
‘think before acting’. Additionally, they tend to follow and be respectful of laws and 
regulations. The construct of dependability seems to be quite similar to the precursors of 
a prevention focus (i.e., strong oughts, security needs, & non-losses - losses) and 
therefore dependability was expected to positively lead to a prevention focus and 
negatively to promotion.  
H3: The Dependability facet of Conscientiousness will positively relate to a 
Prevention Focus 
H4: The Dependability facet of Conscientiousness will negatively relate to a 
Promotion Focus 
While these relationships seem theoretically appealing, Moon, Hollenbeck, 
Humphrey, and Maue (2003), among others (e.g., Cohen & Cohen, 1975; Brass, 1985) 
have pointed out the need to reconcile these differential predictions because achievement 
and dependability are facets of the same higher order construct. That is, these two 
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constructs are strongly and positively related to each other. Therefore, Moon et al. (2003) 
stated that “the different and unique effect that each predictor has on the criterion is 
suppressed by the positive relationship between the predictors” (p. 354). Cohen and 
Cohen (1975) have labeled such a condition as ‘cooperative suppression’. Brass (1985) 
has labeled this condition as ‘mutual suppression’ in that the shared variance between 
two highly related constructs (e.g., achievement & dependability) mutually suppresses 
the other’s effect on the outcome (e.g., regulatory focus). In other words, the variance 
obtained by summing the squared bivariate relationships (r2x1y1 + r2x2y1) is less than the 
squared multiple correlation between predictors and the outcome (R2x1x2y1; Cohen & 
Cohen, 1975; Moon et al., 2003). When examining the effects of neuroticism facets on 
decision making, Moon et al. (2003) found no significant bivariate relationships between 
neuroticism facets and the criterion. However, by following the suggestions of Cohen & 
Cohen (1975) and Brass (1985), they ran a simultaneous regression where each facet was 
included to remove the suppressing effects. With the suppressing effects removed, these 
authors found the pattern of relationships they had hypothesized. Therefore, it was 
necessary to simultaneously regress both achievement and dependability on promotion 
and prevention to remove any suppressing effects.  
Another construct believed to predict regulatory focus is that of safety climate. 
Again, safety climate relates to the shared perceptions of enacted safety policies, 
practices, and procedures (Zohar, 2002b). A high safety climate is one in which the 
policies, procedures, and practices regarding safety are stressed by the immediate 
supervisor (i.e., supervisor action & supervisor expectation). Thus, a high safety climate 
is likely to lead employees to behave more safely as it attempts to stress the importance 
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of safe work behaviors by manifesting a sort of ambient stimuli that helps create group 
safety norms (cf. Hackman, 1992). In other words, a high safety climate encourages 
employees to perform the job accurately and safely. Safety climate appears to be at odds 
with a promotion focus due to the differing methods and recipients of allocating 
resources (i.e., safety vs. production). Therefore, it was expected that safety climate 
would negatively relate to a promotion focus.  
H5: Safety Climate will negatively relate to a Promotion Focus 
Safety Climate was also expected to positively relate to a prevention focus. 
Unlike the negative relationship expected between safety climate and promotion focus, it 
is believed that a high safety climate actually promotes a preventative regulatory focus. 
This is due to the climate emphasizing safety practices and not solely focused on 
production. Again, a high safety climate encourages employees to perform the job safely 
and accurately. This is quite similar to the focus of a prevention strategy in that those 
employing a prevention strategy are strategically concerned about safety and not 
committing errors or mistakes (Forster, et al., 2003; Higgins, 1997). This might be 
especially true in more volatile situations or environments (e.g., nuclear facility, air 
traffic controller, military work). Hence, it was expected that high safety climate would 
positively relate to a prevention focus.  
H6: Safety Climate will positively relate to a Prevention Focus 
As discussed above, a climate that stresses production will likely lead to a 
promotion focus. This is because situations in production climates are typically 
expressed or framed in gains. Higgins (1997), Forster et al., (2003), and Kluger et 
al., (1999) have stated that a promotion focus develops when a situation is framed 
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in terms of gains and non-gains. When supervisors stress production, they stress 
gains. Therefore, I expected a positive relationship between a production oriented 
climate and a promotion focus.  
H7: Production Climate will positively relate to a Promotion Focus 
A climate stressing production will lead to a promotion focus, not a 
prevention focus because of the supervisor’s focus (i.e., gains not losses). A 
production climate might even go so far as to destroy a prevention focus. To 
frame a situation for prevention, Forster et al. (2003) has stated that one needs to 
stress non-losses and losses. A production climate does not frame the situation in 
such terms as they are typically expressed in how much the group or organization 
gains. Therefore, I expected a negative relationship between a production oriented 
climate and a prevention focus.  
H8: Production Climate will negatively relate to a Prevention Focus  
 One might believe that mutual suppression will be an issue with climate 
and the differential relationships proposed with regulatory focus. However, pilot 
data has demonstrated only a small negative relationship between the two climate 
constructs (r  = -.14, p < .05). Therefore, suppression was not expected. 
Regardless, a simultaneous regression was conducted to better arrive at unique 
effects.  
Predictors of Performance: Safety & Speed 
Higgins and colleagues (e.g., Forster et al., 2003; Higgins, 1997) have 
begun to describe and demonstrate different performance relationships between 
these two regulatory foci. For example, Forster et al. (2003) found that those 
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individuals employing a promotion focus, whether it be a stable inclination or 
experimentally induced state, completed tasks much quicker than those employing 
a prevention focus, but at the same time had far more errors of commission than 
those employing a prevention focus. However, in easy tasks it is possible for 
safety and speed to coexist. With regard to the current study, it appears that the 
majority of tasks are not simple (e.g., building maintenance, heavy equipment 
use) and do pose a serious safety threat. The following hypotheses rely on this 
assertion.  
In the study by Forster et al. (2003) it appears that those employing a 
prevention strategy focused more resources and behaviors towards completing the 
task more accurately at the expense of time, rather than completing the task more 
quickly at the expense of errors and mistakes. These findings suggest that there is 
indeed a trade-off between speed and accuracy that is due to different regulatory 
concerns and this might be present in organizational settings as well with regard 
to safety and productivity. That is, those that employ a prevention strategy are 
likely to engage tasks in a safer manner due to concerns of avoiding negative 
outcomes (e.g., accident, injury) in task completion. Those employing a 
promotion strategy may not engage tasks in such a manner as they are more 
concerned with achieving positive outcomes (e.g., completing tasks quickly) at 
the cost of committing errors and mistakes (Forster et al., 2003). This ultimately 
might lead to involvement in more accidents for those utilizing a promotion focus 
strategy as they might charge into tasks with more reckless-abandon (i.e., risky 
bias) than those utilizing a prevention focus (i.e., conservative bias). It was 
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believed that a promotion focused strategy would negatively relate to safety 
performance and positively relate to speed and quantity of task completion. The 
reverse pattern of relationships was expected for a prevention focus. Thus, 
hypotheses 9, 10, 11, and 12 are presented.   
H9: A Promotion Focus will negatively relate to safety performance 
H10: A Promotion Focus will positively relate to speed performance 
H11: A Prevention Focus will positively relate to safety performance 
H12: A Prevention Focus will negatively relate to speed performance 
Again, one might believe that mutual suppression might influence the results 
with regard to performance. Pilot data has demonstrated a small to moderate 
relationship between the two regulatory foci. Therefore, suppression was not expected, 
but a simultaneous regression was still conducted to better arrive at unique effects. 
Mediation Tests 
To further examine the role of regulatory focus in occupational safety and 
productivity I specifically tested mediation following Barron and Kenny’s approach 
(1986; See Analysis strategy section). It has been proposed that self-regulatory 
processes and states mediate and/or carry the effects of distal individual differences to 
outcomes (e.g., Kanfer 1990) as well as contextual variables to outcomes (Zohar, 
2003). Therefore, it was expected that regulatory focus will mediate the relationships 
between personality (e.g., achievement & dependability) and performance and the 
relationships between climate and performance. More specifically, it was expected 
that prevention will mediate the relationship between two of its anticipated 
antecedents (i.e., dependability & safety climate) and its anticipated performance 
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outcome (i.e., safety performance). Likewise, it was expected that promotion would 
mediate the relationship between two of its theorized antecedents (i.e., achievement & 
production climate) and its likely performance outcome (i.e., speed/productivity 
performance). Additionally, it is expected that conflicting antecedents and 
performance outcomes will also be mediated by prevention and promotion. Thus, 
hypothesis #13: 
H13: Regulatory Focus will mediate the relationships among personality 
antecedents and performance outcomes and the relationships between climate 
antecedents and performance outcomes.   
Person-by-Situation Tests 
In addition to testing the proposed relationships displayed in Figure 2, 
additional tests were conducted that examined possible interactions between 
personality and climate and how they might influence regulatory focus (see Figure 3). 
It is possible that such interactions might allow for a better understanding of 
regulatory focus in the context of work (cf. Mischel, 1968). Higgins (1997) has 
proposed that one’s regulatory focus is determined by needs, values, and situations. 
One can therefore assume that when all three respective determinants are present 




Figure 3. Person by situation interaction. 
 
As discussed above, safety climate and dependability are likely to lead to a 
preventative focus. If highly dependable individuals find themselves in a high safety 
climate then a preventative focus is likely to be much higher than if such persons are 
in a low safety climate (see Figure 4). On the other hand, if an achievement oriented 
persons find themselves in a production climate they will have a stronger promotion 
focus than such persons in a low production climate (see Figure 5). Thus, hypotheses 
13 and 14 are presented due to the possible enhancing effects of climate and 
personality on respective foci: 
H14: Safety Climate will moderate the relationship between dependability and 
prevention focus such that the positive relationship between dependability and 











H15:  Production Climate will moderate the relationship between achievement 
and promotion focus such that the positive relationship between achievement and 
promotion focus will be stronger in a high production climate than in a low production 







































 Figure 5. H15 Interaction between Achievement and Climate on Promotion 
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While I present these two hypotheses because they are likely the two that help 
explain when one’s regulatory focus is highest, I tested additional interactions that 
might be present between what some have labeled as conflicting antecedents of 
regulatory focus (Kluger et al., 1999). That is, possible interactions might be found 
when needs and values for promotion are present with situations inducing a prevention 
focus (i.e., achievement & safety climate) and vice versa. While I could not make 
specific hypotheses about these relationships due to lack of theory, it was believed that 
in a context such as work the situation or climate might override personal 
characteristics. This belief was reached due to the findings of Forster et al. (2003) and 
Higgins et al. (2001) in that experimental manipulation successfully changed 
participants focus over several tasks.  
I explored such interesting possibilities as I had some preliminary expectations 
regarding these relationships (see Figures 6-11). For example, it might be that the 
proposed negative relationship between achievement and prevention is nullified if the 
person occupies a high safety climate (Figure 6). Or the negative relationship between 
dependability and promotion is nullified by a high production climate (Figure 7). 
Similarly, it might be that the proposed positive relationship between achievement and 
promotion is moderated by safety climate in such a way that the positive relationship 
is canceled out by a high safety climate (Figure 8). Figure 9 depicts the moderated 
relationship between dependability and prevention in such a way that the positive 
relationship between the two constructs is weakened in the presence of a high 
production climate. Figure 10 displays the interaction between dependability and 
safety climate on promotion in such a way that the proposed negative relationship is 
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stronger in a high safety climate. Lastly, the negative relationship between 
achievement and prevention might be stronger if a person occupies a high production 
























































































































A large facilities department located in the Southeast United States agreed to 
participate in the current research in exchange for summary information the study 
provided. The sample consisted of 251 individuals (81.6% male, 17.6% female, 6 not 
reported) subdivided into 51 work units based on individuals reports of group leaders. A 
work unit is a small group comprised of 3-11 persons and answers to a group leader. The 
average age of the sample was 40.5 (SD = 11.5; 3 not reported). The sample was 50.3% 
European-American, 41.5% African-American, 5% Hispanic-American, 3.3% Asian-
American, and 2% Other-American (5 not reported). Additionally, the average time in the 
current job was 5 years (SD=5.8) and 92.8% of the sample felt safety was a primary 
concern in their daily work. 
Design & Procedure 
This research can be broken down into two data collection periods. Initially, all 
employees completed measures of conscientiousness (i.e., facets of dependability & 
achievement), climate (safety & productivity), and regulatory focus (prevention & 
promotion) as well as provided basic demographic information (e.g., race, gender, age). 
The second phase of data collection consisted of gaining supervisor ratings of safety and 
speed/productivity. Each supervisor rated every employee that directly answers to him or 
her. Employee ratings were gained roughly 1 to 3 weeks after employee data were 
collected.  
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Measures & Development Strategy 
Three of the measures described below were validated in a pilot study following 
Hinkin’s (1998) organizational measure development plan. For a full report on this 
validation effort please see Appendix A. The description of measures reflects the final 
results of this validation. Results from the current investigation will address additional 
reliability and validity evidence (e.g., confirmatory factor analysis) from the employee 
sample described above.  
Each measure I needed to develop was developed following the guidelines 
presented by Hinkin (1998). Hinkin suggests a 6 step development plan. Step 1 entails 
item generation and content validation. It should be noted that at least 4 to 6 items per 
construct is recommended by Hinkin, but depends on the evidence of later steps. Gaining 
content validity can be accomplished in a number of ways, but I asked SME’s to sort 
items based on the definition of the construct. Any item that failed to be sorted correctly 
75% of the time was dropped from the scale. Step 2 consisted of initial questionnaire 
administration and step 3 entailed further item reduction using a variety of techniques 
(e.g., internal consistency, exploratory factor analysis). Internal consistency was desired 
to be .70 or greater and each item should load at .40 or greater for the exploratory factor 
analysis. If items are found not meeting these criteria they too will be dropped. Hinkin’s 
4th step called for a confirmatory factor analysis. Gaining construct validity of a new 
measure helps begin to identify a nomological network of associations and thus step 5. 
Lastly, Hinkin suggested replication.  
The measures that I developed followed this process. More specifically, I asked 
SMEs (PhD & MA/MS level researchers) to sort items for all developed scales thus 
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satisfying step one. For steps 2, 3, and 5 I piloted the measures in a sample of employees 
from StudyResponse.com. The proposed larger study and primary focus of this 
dissertation will allow me to gain additional construct validity as well as reassess the 
factor structure of each measure I developed via confirmatory factor analysis. 
Conscientiousness 
The IPIP (Goldberg, 1999) scales of dependability and achievement were used to 
assess the respective subscales of conscientiousness. The reliabilities reported in previous 
studies have been found to be higher than other common measures of conscientiousness 
facets (e.g., NEO) and range from .7 to .8. Each scale contains 10 items and uses a 5-
point Likert format (1 = strongly disagree; 5 = strongly agree).  
Safety Climate 
 Zohar’s (2000) recent measure of safety climate was modified to better capture 
safety climate. Some of Zohar’s items were better suited to capture production demands 
and were therefore used in the production climate scale (see below). The scale assessed 
safety climate based on supervisory practices towards safety. Rather than focus on 
expectations and actions as Zohar did, I was more interested in general safety climate 
used by other researchers (e.g., Griffin & Neal). The scale contains 7 items, uses a 5-
point Likert format (1 = completely disagree; 5 = completely agree), and was shown to be 
internally consistent (α = .88) in the pilot study.  
Production Climate 
Continuing down the line of reasoning that Zohar (2000) followed for the 
development of his safety climate scale, I developed a brief measure that captures 
production climate. Specifically, I adapted Zohar’s (2000) safety climate measure to 
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more adequately capture supervisory practices and policies regarding production (i.e., 
speed of task completion). The scale contains 5 items, uses a 5-point Likert format (1 = 
completely disagree; 5 = completely agree), and has been shown to be internally 
consistent (α = .78).  
Regulatory Focus 
The measure of regulatory focus was also developed and validated in the pilot 
study. The measure contains two factors: (1) promotion focus and (2) prevention focus.  
The promotion factor contains 10 items and the prevention factor contains 11 items. The 
scale uses a 5-point Likert format (1 = never; 5 = constantly) and both factors were found 
to be internally consistent in the pilot study (promotion α = .88 & prevention α = .86).  
Safety & Productivity/Speed Ratings 
Ratings of safety and productivity were developed with the assistance of SMEs. 
Safety items were drawn from Burke et al’s. (2002) general safety performance measure 
and Hofmann & Stetzor’s safety scale. Production/speed performance items were written 
to reflect the speed of task completion. The scales use a 5-point Likert format (1 = never; 
5 = constantly). Each measure has been shown to be a separate factor via exploratory 
factor analysis and has demonstrated adequate internal consistency (production/speed α = 
.75 & safety performance α = .91).  
Analysis Strategy 
 Psychometrics 
 Prior to hypothesis testing I assessed the psychometrics of all measures. It was 
desired to have adequate internal consistency (i.e., ≥ .70) and stable factor structures for 
all measures. I assessed factor structures in LISREL using confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Additionally, I to assessed the viability for aggregation of climate measures. It should be 
noted that I retained many of the items that I reported I dropped in the validation to 
reassess their properties.   
Aggregation Issues 
The first step in multilevel modeling is the assessment of necessary prerequisites 
or rather the viability of higher level variables. Following Chan’s (1998) typology of 
composition models, climate can be theoretically conceptualized to represent a referent 
shift model of aggregation because the focus is on the group rather than the individual. 
Chan stated that “organizational climate is essentially the same as psychological climate, 
except that the former refers to the shared perceptions among the individuals” (p. 237); 
the referent has changed. Zohar (2003a) has proposed three steps to determine if 
aggregation is viable: (1) show sufficient within-group homogeneity, (2) show between-
group heterogeneity, & (3) the unit of analysis naturally occurs. According to Zohar, if 
these steps are not met then aggregation is not warranted and the construct, climate, can 
and should be treated as a lower level construct (i.e., psychological climate). Each of 
these steps will be addressed in more detail in the next few paragraphs.  
Step 1 states that a researcher needs to show sufficient within-group homogeneity. 
Within-group properties can be assessed in two ways: agreement and reliability. Within-
group agreement refers to the extent that individual’s ratings are interchangeable. In other 
words, all ratings appear to be the same. To assess agreement James, Demaree, & Wolf 
(1984; 1993) developed the rwg(j) statistic. If rwg(j)  is equal to or greater than .70, then 
aggregation is warranted as there is sufficient within-group agreement. Reliability on the 
other hand refers to the relative consistency of ratings. Two common indices exist for 
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reliability: ICC(1) and ICC(2). Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) stated that ICC(1) is the 
proportion of variance that can be explained by group membership. For example, if an 
ICC(1) value of .18 is obtained, a researcher could claim that 18% of the variance in our 
variable of interest is due to group membership. ICC(2) is an estimate of the reliability of 
the means and if ICC(2) value is greater than or equal to .70 we can assume groups 
means are reliably different (Bliese, 2000).  
To assess between group heterogeneity, one can employ an ANOVA test. This is 
actually the same test that is used to test the significance of ICC(1) values. In this design, 
the independent variable (IV) is ‘group’ or whatever clustering agent one is interested in 
and the dependent variable (DV) is the variable of interest. If the ANOVA is significant, 
then there are reliable differences across groups (i.e., significant heterogeneity).  
If steps 1 and 2 have been satisfied a researcher can claim that there is sufficient 
within-group homogeneity and between-group heterogeneity and move to the third step 
recommended by Zohar (2003a). That is, are the higher level units natural or artificial? If 
we are dealing with work groups or teams, then we need to make sure they are defined as 
such by the organization or the tasks they perform and not based on statistical clustering.  
Hypothesis Testing 
To assess my hypotheses I employed Random Coefficient Modeling  using 
Version 3.0 of the Non-linear and Linear Mixed Effects program for S-PLUS and R 
(Pinheiro & Bates, 2000). Random Coefficient Models (RCMs) are better suited to test 
cross-level relationships than traditional OLS regression and are well suited to test single 
level models as well (Gavin & Hofmann, 2002).  Depending on one’s theory and 
hypothesized relationships, these relationships can be tested in four general steps or a 
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combination of steps theory deems appropriate: (1) test for intercept variability, (2) 
predict intercept variability, (3) test slope variability, and (4) predict slope variability. 
Step 1 has already been discussed above as prerequisites for multi-level modeling and 
aggregation, but in essence step 1 tests whether the variable of interest is non-
independent. One can gain more confidence in step 1 by testing the significance across 
teams. This can be tested by contrasting two competing models: a fixed intercept model 
(i.e., βoj = γ00 + rij) and a random intercept model (i.e., βoj = γ00 + Uoj  + rij). If we find a 
significant -2 log likelihood difference, we can claim that intercepts vary significantly 
between groups. Steps 2, 3, and 4 are the new components and essentially assess and test 
the predictive ability of the cross-level relationships. Step 2 assesses main effects (e.g., 
climate predicting regulatory focus), step 3 assesses slope variability (e.g., whether the 
personality-regulatory focus slope varies across groups), and step 4 tests for moderation 
(e.g., climate moderates the relationship between personality and regulatory focus; Gavin 
& Hofmann, 2002).  
The following equations highlight tests for individual level relationships (equation 
1), cross-level main effects (equation 2), and cross-level interactions (equation 3). More 
specifically, equation 1 represents a level 1 relationship in which personality is predicting 
individual Regulatory Focus. Equation 2 represents a level 2 relationship in which 
climate predicts variance in the level 1 intercepts (i.e., βoj ; main effects for regulatory 
focus) and equation 3 represents a level 2 relationship in which safety climate predicts 
variance in level 1 slopes (i.e., β1j ; moderation of the personality-regulatory focus 
relationship).   
Level 1 Model:  Focus = βoj + β1j Personalityij + eij    (1) 
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Level 2 Model:  βoj = γ00 + γ 01 (Climatej) +Uoj              (2) 
                          β1j = γ10 + γ 11 (Climatej) +U1j               (3)  
While theory is important to guide our testing, it is possible to test all three 
equations at one time. However, it might be theoretically relevant to test for specific main 
effects or specific moderating effects such as I have laid out in my hypotheses. Testing 
for main effects only has been labeled intercepts-as-outcomes (i.e., step 2; Gavin & 
Hofmann, 2002) and this is how I will test hypotheses 1-12. And therefore the 
moderating effects are not included. This is displayed in equation 6, by excluding  γ 11  
and U1j.  
Level 1 Model:  Focusij = βoj + β1j Personalityij + eij    (4) 
Level 2 Model:  βoj = γ00 + γ 01 (Climatej) +Uoj              (5) 
                          β1j = γ10                                                   (6)  
On the other hand, one can also test for slopes-as-outcomes (Kreft & de Fleeuw, 
1998; Gavin & Hofmann, 2002). This model is displayed previously in equations 1-3. 
One can add in the group level variable to equation 6 and this allows slopes to vary 
randomly. Predicting slopes-as-outcomes in essence tests for moderation among the 
variables of interest and thus I will assess hypotheses 14 and 15 in such a manner as well 
as other exploratory interactions.  
To assess hypothesis #13, I will use the approach suggested by Barron and Kenny 
(1986). In this approach, mediation is supported if four steps or criteria are met. First, a 
distal construct must relate to the outcome. However, Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger (1998) 
later claimed that this relationship might not need to be significant if such relationships 
are quite distal. In other words, an indirect effect may still be found. Secondly, the distal 
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predictor must relate to the mediator. Thirdly, the mediator must relate to the outcome 
after controlling for the distal predictor. Fourthly, to claim full mediation the relationship 
(if one was found) between the distal predictor and the outcome is no longer significant 
in the presence of the mediator. However, if both relationships are significant, then partial 






The results section is presented in three parts.  First the psychometric properties of 
measures used in the study are presented. This section includes assessments of internal 
consistency for all measures as well as confirmatory factor analyses for the measures I 
developed. Next I will assess the viability of the climate constructs at the group level by 
assessing group agreement and reliability as well as differences across groups (Zohar, 
2003). In the next section, the hypotheses described above will be assessed as well as 
additional exploratory tests using random coefficient modeling. All descriptive data and 
zero-order correlations can be found in Table 1. 
Table 1. 
 
Descriptives and correlations among variables 
 
Variables M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Promotion 3.9 .74 .89        
2. Prevention 4.2 .90 .06 .96       
3. Safety Climate 3.4 .63 -.03 .47* .85      
4. Prod. Climate 2.8 .59 .17* -.40* -.49* .81     
5. Achievement 3.9 .65 .19* .23* .20* .02 .74    
6. Dependability 3.8 .85 -.04 .31* .37* -.14* .47* .73   
7. Safety 3.7 .67 -.20* .44* .26* -.31* .10 .27* .85  
8. Speed 3.1 .65 .30* -.23* -.06 .13* .06 .07 -.17* .69 
Note. * p < .05; Prod. = Productivity; Safety = Supervisor Safety Ratings; Speed = 




Regulatory Focus Questionnaire. The 21 item RFQ described above and in the 
Appendix yielded acceptable internal consistency for prevention (α = .96) and promotion 
(α = .89). Using LISREL 8.5 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1993), the factor structure identified 
in the Pilot Study (see Appendix) was tested via confirmatory factor analysis. 
Additionally, the two factor model (i.e., prevention & promotion) was tested against a 
single factor structure comprised of all items loading on a single regulatory focus 
construct. Results revealed that the two factor model fit the data well: χ2188 = 380.07, CFI 
= .93, RMSEA = .07, SRMR = .06. The single factor model did not fit the data well: χ2189 
= 977.76, CFI = .69, RMSEA = .22, SRMR = .20. Additionally, to test the fit between 
nested models Chi-Square difference tests can be employed. The difference in Chi-
Square was found to be significant (∆χ21 = 597.69, p > .05) which suggests the two factor 
structure fits the data significantly better. Thus, I retained the two factor structure 
originally proposed. Additionally, all loadings were significant and greater than .6. 
Climate Measures.  The internal consistency for both climate measures was found 
to be adequate. Specifically, safety climate had an internal consistency of .85, while 
production climate had an internal consistency of .81. Using confirmatory factor analysis, 
I retested the factor structure of the climate measures that was found in the Pilot Study. 
As with the RFQ, I assessed model differences between a one factor solution (i.e., 
climate) and the two dimensions of climate proposed (i.e., safety & productivity). The 
one factor model did not fit the data well: χ253 = 559.84, CFI = .74, RMSEA = .19, 
SRMR = .12. The fit for the two factor model was much better: χ252 = 166.35, CFI = .91, 
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RMSEA = .09, SRMR = .07. Additionally, the Chi-Square difference test was found to be 
significant: ∆χ21 = 393.49, p > .05. All loadings for the two factor model were significant.  
Performance. Two indices of performance were constructed and initially validated 
in the Pilot Study. The internal consistency of the safety performance measure was found 
to be adequate (α = .85), but the internal consistency for the speed performance measure 
was just below the traditional cutoff of .70 (i.e., .69). However, the internal consistency 
found in the pilot study was higher (i.e., .78). When examining the factor structure of the 
performance measures, I again employed confirmatory factor analysis. The one factor 
model (i.e., combined performance) did not fit the data well: χ244 = 361.32, CFI = .78, 
RMSEA = .17, SRMR = .14. The fit for the two factor model was much better: χ243 = 
121.78, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .08, SRMR = .11. The Chi-Square difference test also 
supported the two factor model: ∆χ21 = 239.54, p > .05. All loadings were significant. 
Conscientiousness Facets. Each of the conscientiousness facets was found to have 
acceptable internal consistency. Achievement had an internal consistency of .74. 
Dependability had an internal consistency of .73.  
Aggregation of Climate 
Following the data analysis plan for aggregation laid out above, it is necessary to 
demonstrate group viability for the two climate constructs. Zohar (2003a) suggests three 
steps to determine if aggregation is viable: (1) show sufficient within-group homogeneity, 
(2) show between-group heterogeneity, & (3) the unit of analysis naturally occurs. Using 
a uniform null distribution the average rwg(j) value for safety climate was .79 (range: 0-
0.99; SD = .27) and the average value for production climate was .74 (range: 0-.99; SD = 
.28). Even though a small number of groups did not agree (i.e., rwg(j) values < .70) as 
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noted by the range of values, the mean rwg(j) values suggest that on average groups did 
agree.  
ICCs were computed using the formula reported in Bliese (2000) and parts 
derived from a one-way analysis of variance where climate was the focal variable and 
group ID was the independent variable: ICC(1) = [MSB-MSW]/[MSB+(k-1)*MSW]; 
ICC(2) = [MSB-MSW]/MSB2. ICCs for safety climate, ICC(1) = .45, ICC(2) = .78; 
F50,200 = 4.5, p < .05, were higher than ICCs for production climate, ICC(1) = .25, ICC(2) 
= .61; F50,200 = 2.5, p < .05. These results support the viability of safety and production 
climate as group level constructs. Specifically, the rwg(j) values support high agreement 
within groups as do the ICC(1) values for reliability and differences were found across 
groups (ICC(2) & ANOVA tests). While the ICC(2) value for production is below the 
recommended .70 cutoff for reliable group means, climate is operationalized as a group 
level construct and all other aggregation evidence tends to support aggregation. 
Therefore, I proceeded to tests my hypotheses with climate at the group level.   
Hypothesis Testing 
By examining the correlations presented in Table 1 support was gained for many 
of the hypotheses that were presented. However, these relationships do not shed much 
light on the uniqueness of relationships. Additionally, the mutual suppression effect 
discussed by Moon et al. (2003) is not taken into account nor is the group aspect of 
climate. Therefore it is necessary to test all relationships with all hypothesized predictors 
included in the model.  
                                                 
2 MSB = Mean Square between groups; MSW = Mean Square within groups; k = average number of group 
members. 
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Predictors of Prevention Focus. Safety climate and dependability were 
hypothesized to positively predict a prevention focus (i.e., H3 & H6, respectively) and 
production climate and achievement were hypothesized to negatively predict a prevention 
focus (i.e., H2 & H8, respectively). Results revealed significant relationships for all 
predictors. However, the direction of the relationship achievement shares with prevention 
was not negative, but rather positive. However, this relationship does not appear to be as 
strong as the relationship that dependability shares with prevention. Specifics results are 
displayed in Table 2.  
Table 2. 
Predictors of Prevention Focus 
Variable Estimate SE df t - test p-value 
(intercept) 2.45 .77 198 3.19 .00 
Safety climate .34 .14 48 2.46 .01 
Dependability .23 .07 198 3.50 .00 
Production Climate -.36 .15 48 -2.54 .01 
Achievement .20 .07 198 2.70 .00 
      
Note. R2 for Level 1 predictors = .15; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .383.  
Predictors of Promotion Focus. Achievement and production climate were hypothesized 
to positively predict a promotion focus (i.e., H1 & H7, respectively). Dependability and 
safety climate were hypothesized to negatively predict a promotion focus (i.e., H4 & H5, 
                                                 
3 R2 values were computed using: 1 – (Varw/ predictor / Varw/o predictor); For Level 1 predictors the denominator 
used was the within-group variance & Level 2 the between-group variance. Thus, R2 values are not 
computed relative to the total variance in the outcome and therefore cannot be interpreted in the same light 
as traditional OLS regression (e.g., 15% of prevention is captured by dependability & achievement; 
Hofmann, Griffin, & Gavin, 2000). Rather Level 1 R2 should be interpreted as amount of within-group 
variance accounted for in the focal variable by Level 1 predictors and Level 2 R2 should be interpreted as 
the amount of between-group variance accounted for in the focal variable by Level 2 predictors. 
Additionally, when modeling slopes-as-outcomes (i.e., interactions) the use and interpretation of these 
values does not apply (Kreft & de Leeuw, 2000). 
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respectively). Results supported hypotheses one and seven, but not hypotheses four and 
five. Detailed results are presented below in Table 3. 
Table 3. 
Predictors of Promotion Focus 
Variable Estimate SE df t - test p-value 
(intercept) 2.33 .61 198 3.80 .00 
Safety climate .06 .11 48 .53 .59 
Dependability -.06 .07 198 -1.05 .29 
Production Climate .22 .11 48 1.99 .05 
Achievement .27 .08 198 3.47 .00 
      
Note. R2 for Level 1 predictors = .06; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .05.  
 
Predictors of Performance. It was hypothesized that prevention would positively 
relate to safety (i.e., H11) whereas promotion would negatively relate to safety 
performance (i.e., H9). Results supported both hypotheses. For speed performance, a 
positive relationship was hypothesized for promotion (H10) and a negative relationship 
for prevention (i.e., H12). Similarly, to safety performance, both relationships were found 




Predictors of Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
DV=Safety Performance 
   (intercept) 3.04 .26 198 11.83 .00 
   Prevention .30 .04 198 6.77 .00 
   Promotion -.16 .05 198 -3.18 .00 
   - R2 for Level 1 predictors of Safety Performance = .07. 
 
DV=Speed Performance 
   (intercept) 2.77 .27 198 10.28 .00 
   Prevention -.17 .05 198 -3.78 .00 
   Promotion .28 .05 198 5.34 .00 
   - R2 for Level 1 predictors of Safety Performance = .10. 
 
 
Mediation Tests. To assess the mediating effects of prevention and promotion I 
employed the steps discussed by Kenny et al (1998) and summarized above. The first 
four models are ones in which prevention mediates the relationships between climate and 
personality and performance and the last four are promotion mediated models. These 
models are depicted in Figures 12-19. It should be noted that some of the mediation tests 
could be tested in one mediation analysis, but they will not due to possible suppression 
effects. In an interesting caveat to mutual suppression, the variance obtained by summing 
the squared bivariate relationships (r2x1y1 + r2x2y1) is greater than the squared multiple 
correlation between predictors and the outcome (R2x1x2y1; Moon, personal 
communication, February, 2004; Smith, Ager, & Williams, 1992; Velicer, 1978). Thus, 





















Figure 13. Mediating Role of Prevention for Production Climate and Safety 
Performance and Achievement and Safety Performance 
Individual level 
Figure 12. Mediating Role of Prevention for Safety Climate and Safety Performance 


















Figure 15. Mediating Role of Prevention for Production Climate and Speed 
Performance and Achievement and Speed Performance 
Individual level 
Figure 14. Mediating Role of Prevention for Safety Climate and Speed Performance 

















Figure 17. Mediating Role of Promotion for Safety Climate and Speed Performance 
and Dependability and Speed Performance 
Individual level 
Figure 16. Mediating Role of Promotion for Production Climate and Speed 

















Figure 19. Mediating Role of Promotion for Production Climate and Safety 
Performance and Achievement and Safety Performance 
Individual level 
Figure 18. Mediating Role of Promotion for Safety Climate and Safety Performance 
and Dependability and Safety Performance 
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Results for these models are summarized below in Table 5-12. Beginning with the 
mediating role of prevention for safety climate and dependability, step 1 shows that 
safety climate significantly predicted safety performance, but dependability did not. 
Following the recommendation of Kenny et al. (1998) I proceeded with mediation tests 
because these authors stated that it is not necessary for the relationships in step 1 to be 
significant for mediation to exist; the indirect effect(s) may still be present and 
significant. In step 2, predicting the mediator, both dependability and safety climate were 
found to be significant. From the prevention focus results (Table 5), one can see that 
prevention was significant when entered into the equation in the third regression. 
However, dependability was nonsignificant, as one expect, but safety climate remained a 
significant predictor of safety performance. These results suggest two things. First, that 
prevention only partially mediated the cross-level relationship between safety climate and 
safety performance. In other words, safety climate directly and indirectly influences 
safety performance. Secondly, that an indirect effect might still be present for 
dependability predicting safety performance via a prevention focus.   
 To test for an indirect effect, three test statistics4 were computed: the Sobel test 
(Sobel, 1982) and Goodman (I) and (II) tests (Goodman, 1960). All three tests in 
combination are likely to yield a better assessment of significant indirect effects and 
therefore all three are reported.  The results for the indirect effect of safety climate on 
safety performance were: Indirect effect = .30*.23 = .07, Sobel = 3.38 (p < .05), 
Goodman (I) = 3.34 (p < .05), and Goodman (II) = 3.42 (p < .05). The results for the 
                                                 
4 Sobel test equation: z-value = a*b/SQRT(b2*sa2 + a2*sb2) 
  Goodman (I) test equation: z-value = a*b/SQRT(b2*sa2 + a2*sb2 + sa2*sb2) 
  Goodman (II) test equation: z-value = a*b/SQRT(b2*sa2 + a2*sb2 - sa2*sb2) 
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indirect effect of dependability on safety performance (.49*.23=.11) were all significant: 
Sobel = 2.92 (p < .05), Goodman (I) = 2.87 (p < .05), and Goodman (II) = 2.95 (p < .05). 
These results suggest that the indirect effects of safety climate and dependability on 
safety performance are significant and meaningful. 
 
Table 5. 
Mediating Role of Prevention for Safety Climate and Safety 
Performance and Dependability and Safety Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Safety Performance 
  (intercept) 2.47 .35 199 6.99 .00 
  Safety Climate .21 .05 49 4.17 .00 
  Dependability .12 .10 199 1.22 .23 




  (intercept) 1.41 .46 199 3.08 .00 
  Safety Climate .30 .06 49 4.78 .00 
  Dependability .49 .13 199 3.80 .00 




  (intercept) 2.13 .32 198 6.54 .00 
  Safety Climate .14 .05 49 2.80 .01 
  Dependability .02 .09 198 .18 .85 
  Prevention .23 .05 198 4.56 .00 




Support for the mediating role of prevention with regards to achievement and 
production climate were also significant. Table 6 highlights these results. Step 1 revealed 
that production climate significantly predicted safety performance, but achievement only 
marginally predicted safety performance. Again, I proceeded with the mediation tests 
because indirect effects might still be significant. Step 2 yielded significant effects for 
both production climate and achievement. Step 3 found that prevention was significant 
and Step 4 found that the effects of production climate were reduced in the presence of 
the mediator and achievement was still non-significant. This suggests that prevention 
mediates the negative effects of production climate on safety performance and that there 
is a possible indirect effect for achievement.  
Again, to assess indirect effects I employed the three tests described above. 
Results for production climate were: Indirect effect -.58*.25 = -.15; Sobel = -3.32 (p < 
.05), Goodman (I) = -3.29 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = -3.37 (p < .05). Results for 
achievement’s indirect effect (.32*.25 = .08) were much the same: Sobel = 3.37 (p < .05), 
Goodman (I) = 3.33 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = 3.41 (p < .05). 
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Table 6. 
Mediating Role of Prevention for Production Climate and Safety 
Performance and Achievement and Safety Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Safety Performance 
  (intercept) 4.17 .36 199 11.4 .00 
  Production Climate -.31 .09 49 -3.12 .00 
  Achievement .10 .05 199 1.77 .07 




  (intercept) 4.64 .47 199 9.78 .00 
  Production Climate -.58 .13 49 -4.38 .00 
  Achievement .32 .07 199 4.53 .00 




  (intercept) 3.02 .40 198 7.41 .00 
  Production Climate -.16 .09 49 -1.76 .08 
  Achievement .02 .05 198 .39 .69 
  Prevention .25 .05 198 5.09 .00 
- R2 for Level 1 predictors = .07; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .40 
 
 
Support for the mediating role of prevention with regards to safety climate and 
dependability and speed performance was also found (see Table 7). Step 1 revealed that 
neither safety climate nor dependability significantly predicted speed performance. 
Again, I proceeded with the mediation tests because indirect effects might still be 
significant. Step 2 yielded significant effects for both safety climate and dependability. 
Step 3 found that prevention was significant and Step 4 found that the effects of 
production climate were still non-significant. However, there are possible indirect effects 
that might be found.  
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Results for safety climate were: Indirect effect .30*-.17 = -.05; Sobel = -2.81 (p < 
.05), Goodman (I) = -2.77 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = -2.85 (p < .05). Results for 
dependability’s indirect effect (.49*-.17 = -.08) were much the same: Sobel = -2.52 (p < 
.05), Goodman (I) = -2.48 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = -2.58 (p < .05).  
Table 7. 
Mediating Role of Prevention for Safety Climate and Speed 
Performance and Dependability and Speed Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Speed Performance 
  (intercept) 3.19 .32 199 9.95 .00 
  Safety Climate -.06 .09 49 -.76 .45 
  Dependability .04 .05 199 .79 .42 




  (intercept) 1.41 .46 199 3.08 .00 
  Safety Climate .30 .06 49 4.78 .00 
  Dependability .49 .13 199 3.80 .00 




  (intercept) 3.46 .30 198 11.24 .00 
  Safety Climate .02 .08 49 .24 .80 
  Dependability .02 .04 198 .32 .72 
  Prevention -.17 .05 198 -3.36 .00 
  - R2 for Level 1 predictors = .12; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .32. 
 
 
While mediation was not supported for the mediating role of prevention with 
regards to production climate and achievement for speed performance (see Table 8), 
indirect effects were still found. Results for production climate were: Indirect effect -
.58*-.17 = .09; Sobel = 2.49 (p < .05), Goodman (I) = 2.45 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = 
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2.53 (p < .05). Results for achievement’s indirect effect (.32*-.15 = -.05) were much the 
same: Sobel = -2.51 (p < .05), Goodman (I) = -2.47 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = -2.55 (p < 
.05). 
Table 8. 
Mediating Role of Prevention for Production Climate and Speed 
Performance and Achievement and Speed Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Speed Performance 
  (intercept) 2.73 .36 199 7.62 .00 
  Production Climate .09 .09 49 1.05 .29 
  Achievement .03 .06 199 .48 .62 




  (intercept) 4.64 .47 199 9.78 .00 
  Production Climate -.58 .13 49 -4.38 .00 
  Achievement .32 .07 199 4.53 .00 




  (intercept) 3.45 .42 198 8.16 .00 
  Production Climate .01 .09 49 .07 .92 
  Achievement .03 .06 198 .35 .68 
  Prevention -.15 .05 198 -3.03 .00 
  - R2 for Level 1 predictors = .02; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .38. 
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Support for the mediating role of promotion was also found and specific details 
can be found below in Tables 9, 10, 11, & 12. With regards for the mediating role of 
promotion for production climate and achievement on speed performance, step 1 found 
that neither production climate nor achievement were significant predictors of speed 
performance. I proceeded with meditation tests as highlighted above. Step 2 shows that 
both predictors significantly related to the mediator (i.e., promotion). Lastly, in the third 
regression promotion was found to be significant, while production climate and 
achievement remained nonsignificant. This suggests that there are indirect effects on 
speed performance stemming from production climate and achievement. 
Again, to assess indirect effects I employed the three tests described above. 
Results for production climate were: Indirect effect .21*.25 = .05; Sobel = 1.94 (p < 
.051), Goodman (I) = 1.90 (p < .057), Goodman (II) = 1.97 (p < .05). Results for 
achievement’s indirect effect (.24*.25 = .06) were all significant: Sobel = 2.82 (p < .05), 
Goodman (I) = 2.78 (p < .05), Goodman (II) = 2.86 (p < .05). These results suggest that 




Mediating Role of Promotion for Production Climate and Speed 
Performance and Achievement and Speed Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Speed Performance 
  (intercept) 2.73 .36 199 7.62 .00 
  Production Climate .09 .09 49 1.05 .29 
  Achievement .03 .06 199 .48 .62 




  (intercept) 2.41 .39 199 6.07 .00 
  Production Climate .21 .10 49 2.08 .04 
  Achievement .24 .07 199 3.44 .00 




  (intercept) 2.13 .37 198 5.74 .00 
  Production Climate .04 .09 49 .47 .63 
  Achievement -.03 .06 198 -.51 .60 
  Promotion .25 .05 198 4.65 .00 




Tests for the mediating role of promotion for dependability and speed 
performance and for safety climate and speed performance failed to support mediation 
and are presented in Table 10.  No tests for indirect effects were conducted due to the 
failure of step 2 (i.e., X does not relate to M). 
Table 10. 
Mediating Role of Promotion for Safety Climate and Speed 
Performance and Dependability and Speed Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Speed Performance 
  (intercept) 3.19 .32 199 9.95 .00 
  Safety Climate -.06 .09 49 -.76 .45 
  Dependability .04 .05 199 .79 .42 




  (intercept) 3.94 .36 199 10.85 .00 
  Safety Climate -.02 .11 49 -.23 .81 
  Dependability .02 .06 199 .39 .70 




  (intercept) 2.21 .37 198 5.98 .00 
  Safety Climate -.06 .08 49 -.75 .45 
  Dependability .03 .05 198 .74 .45 
  Promotion .25 .05 198 4.73 .00 
- R2 for Level 1 predictors = .02; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .02 
 
 
Tests for the mediating role of promotion for dependability and safety 
performance and for safety climate and safety performance failed to support mediation 
and are presented in Table 11.  No tests for indirect effects were conducted due to the 
failure of step 2 (i.e., X does not relate to M). 
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Table 11. 
Mediating Role of Promotion for Safety Climate and Safety 
Performance and Dependability and Safety Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Safety Performance 
  (intercept) 2.47 .35 199 6.99 .00 
  Safety Climate .21 .05 49 4.17 .00 
  Dependability .12 .10 199 1.22 .23 




  (intercept) 3.94 .36 199 10.85 .00 
  Safety Climate -.02 .11 49 -.23 .81 
  Dependability .02 .06 199 .39 .70 




  (intercept) 2.86 .39 198 7.24 .00 
  Safety Climate .21 .05 49 4.22 .00 
  Dependability .12 .09 198 1.27 .20 
  Promotion -.10 .05 198 -1.99 .05 
- R2 for Level 1 predictors = .07; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .12 
 
 
Lastly, tests for the mediating role of promotion with regards to production 
climate and safety performance and achievement and safety performance were 
conducted. These results are presented below in Table 12. Step 1 found that production 
climate significantly related safety performance while achievement only marginally 
related to safety performance. Step 2 found significant results, while step 3 found that 
promotion significantly related to safety performance in the presence of production 
climate and achievement. These results suggest that promotion partially mediated the 
relationship between production climate and safety performance. Tests for indirect effects 
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yielded marginal support for an indirect effect from production climate to safety 
performance: Indirect effect .21*-.14 = -.03; Sobel = -1.80 (p = .07), Goodman (I) = -1.75 
(p =.08), Goodman (II) = -1.86 (p = .06). Results for achievement’s indirect effect (.24*-
.14 = .03) were all significant: Sobel = -2.45 (p < .05), Goodman (I) = -2.40 (p < .05), 
Goodman (II) = -2.50 (p < .05).  
Table 12. 
Mediating Role of Promotion for Production Climate and Safety 
Performance and Achievement and Safety Performance 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Step 1:  
DV=Safety Performance 
  (intercept) 4.17 .36 199 11.4 .00 
  Production Climate -.31 .09 49 -3.12 .00 
  Achievement .10 .05 199 1.77 .07 




  (intercept) 2.41 .39 199 6.07 .00 
  Production Climate .21 .10 49 2.08 .04 
  Achievement .24 .07 199 3.44 .00 




  (intercept) 4.44 .38 198 11.69 .00 
  Production Climate -.28 .09 49 -2.98 .04 
  Achievement .09 .06 198 1.81 .07 
  Promotion -.14 .04 198 -2.06 .04 
- R2 for Level 1 predictors = .03; R2 for Level 2 predictors = .33 
 
 
Overall, all of these mediation tests and indirect effect tests suggest that both 
prevention and promotion do indeed play an important process role as both were found to 
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carry indirect effects from antecedents to performance outcomes. These results will be 
revisited in the discussion section.  
Person-by-Situation Interaction Tests. Two cross-level interactions were 
hypothesized (i.e., H14 & H15). However these two expected interactions did not reach 
significance (p = .22; p  = .25, respectively). Exploratory tests for possible interactions 
between climate facets and conscientiousness facets revealed no significant interaction 
effects. However, the majority of interactions seemed to follow the expected pattern of 
relationships and results are presented below in Table 9 and 10 for prevention and 
promotion, respectively. Additional data and future research is needed to better evaluate 
such exciting possibilities.   
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Table 13. 
Interaction Results for Prevention 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Safety Climate*Dependability 
  (intercept) -.44 1.86 198 -.23 .81 
  Safety Climate 1.04 .54 49 1.92 .06 
  Dependability .84 .45 198 1.85 .06 
  Safety Climate*    
  Dependability 
-.15 .12 198 -1.22 .22 
      
Safety Climate*Achievement 
  (intercept) -1.25 2.12 198 -.59 .55 
  Safety Climate 1.25 .62 49 2.01 .04 
  Achievement .91 .52 198 1.75 .08 
  Safety Climate*  
  Achievement 
-.17 .15 198 -1.13 .26 
      
Production Climate*Dependability 
  (intercept) 6.97 1.75 198 3.97 .00 
  Production Climate -1.41 .60 49 -2.33 .02 
  Dependability -.41 .43 198 -.96 .33 
  Production Climate   
 *Dependability 
.26 .15 198 1.38 .12 
      
Production Climate*Achievement 
  (intercept) 7.08 2.09 198 3.38 .00 
  Production Climate -1.51 .73 49 -2.06 .04 
  Achievement -.29 .51 198 -.57 .56 
  Production Climate   
 *Achievement 




Interaction Results for Promotion 
Variable Estimate SE df t – test p-value 
Production Climate*Achievement 
  (intercept) 4.16 1.89 198 2.20 .03 
  Production Climate -.57 .67 49 -.85 .39 
  Achievement -.19 .49 198 -.40 .68 
  Production Climate   
 *Achievement 
.20 .17 198 1.14 .25 
      
Production Climate*Dependability 
  (intercept) 4.20 1.32 198 3.16 .00 
  Production Climate -.13 .46 49 -.30 .76 
  Dependability -.23 .34 198 -.69 .48 
  Production Climate   
 *Dependability 
.09 .12 198 .80 .42 
      
Safety Climate*Dependability 
  (intercept) 4.48 1.27 198 3.52 .00 
  Safety Climate -.18 .36 49 -.49 .62 
  Dependability -.12 .32 198 -.38 .70 
  Safety Climate*    
  Dependability 
.04 .09 198 .46 .64 
      
Safety Climate*Achievement 
  (intercept) 1.46 1.92 198 .75 .44 
  Safety Climate .31 .56 49 .54 .58 
  Achievement .72 .51 198 1.43 .16 
  Safety Climate*  
  Achievement 





By applying an interactionist approach (Cronbach, 1957; Endler, 1977) and 
following Dekker’s (2002) new view of occupational safety, the current study has found 
that both individual differences and contextual variables play an important and unique 
role in predicting and explaining why some employees are fast and some are safe. This is 
also one of the first studies that I know of that has examined a process model (Feldman, 
1999; Mischel & Shoda, 1995) of occupational safety, which has helped explain how 
certain distal individual and organizational characteristics directly and indirectly 
influence employee safety and task completion rate. Below I revisit the findings of the 
current study, describe some of the study’s limitations, and note avenues for future 
research to address these limitations and expand on the current findings.  
The current study has led to many exciting and sometimes contradictory findings. 
To begin with, the measures that were developed in the validation study seemed to 
generalize quite well with this new sample. That is, the psychometric properties were 
found to be much the same. With the exception of the speed performance measure, all 
internal consistencies were found to be above the traditional cutoff of .70. However, the 
speed performance measure barely missed this cutoff (i.e., .69) and I did not think this to 
be that markedly a difference. The factor structures of the three measures I adapted and 
developed were found to be the same using a confirmatory approach. Hinkin (1998) has 
stated that confirming a factor structure is an important step in the development of 
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organizational surveys. In short, over the two studies, these three measures have met all 
of Hinkin’s (1998) validation steps with much success.  
The results of the hypotheses tests were mixed. If this were strictly a numbers 
game, it seems I hit on 67% of my hypotheses and missed the other 33%. Specifically, I 
found support for hypotheses 1, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, (i.e., main effects) and ‘qualified’ 
support for hypothesis 13 (i.e., mediation/indirect effects). Supporting the prevention 
domain of regulatory focus, I found that prevention was positively predicted by safety 
climate and dependability and that it in turn positively predicted safety performance and 
negatively predicted speed performance. Likewise, I found additional support for the 
promotion domain of regulatory focus in that production climate and achievement 
positively predicted promotion and that it in turn positively predicted speed performance 
and negatively predicted safety performance.  
In support of hypothesis 13, I found that prevention partially mediated the 
relationships between safety climate and safety performance and fully mediated the 
relationship between production climate and safety performance. Additionally, indirect 
effects on safety performance were found for safety climate, dependability, production 
climate, and achievement via a prevention focus as well as indirect effects on speed 
performance from safety climate, dependability, production climate, and achievement. I 
also found support for mediating and indirect effects via promotion between production 
climate and speed performance and between achievement and speed performance as well 
as indirect effects for production climate and achievement on safety performance. I did 
not find any mediating or indirect effects for promotion with regards to safety climate or 
dependability. These results provide good support for Higgins’ (1997) proposed 
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antecedents and behavioral outcomes of prevention and promotion as well as Kanfer’s 
(1990) suggestion that distal constructs relate to performance and outcomes through more 
proximal regulatory processes.   
I did not find support for hypotheses 2, 4, and 5. Theoretically this is quite 
interesting. Higgins (1997) as well as Kluger et al., (2000) have stated that prevention 
and promotion are orthogonal constructs and support for this has been shown in previous 
research (e.g., Higgins, et al., 2001) and in the current study (r = -.06). Yet, as noted by 
Kluger et al. (2000), proposed antecedents of prevention and promotion negatively relate 
to each other. This was the case for the climate facets and Higgins (1997) has stated that 
while these antecedents negatively relate to each other, they “have distinct relations with 
promotion focus and prevention focus” (p. 1282). This tends to suggest that conflicting 
antecedents do not negatively influence one’s focus. However, this would not explain the 
negative relationship between production climate and prevention or the positive 
relationship achievement shares with prevention. Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1964) 
might help clarify the negative relationship between production climate and prevention. 
Perhaps in a work environment, employees hold self expectations to produce because in 
essence that is why they are there; to produce. This could dissuade a prevention focus, 
which may be perceived to reduce output. This line of reasoning could also help explain 
the null relationship between safety climate and promotion. That is, it could be that safety 
climate only promotes a prevention focus, but does not dissuade a promotion focus due to 
overriding self expectations. Future research is needed to test this theoretical reasoning.  
Another seemingly contradictory finding was the positive relationship between 
achievement and prevention. However, upon further review, a prevention focus falls into 
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the larger approach domain (Higgins, et al., 1994) and should be concerned with 
achievement, but perhaps not as strongly as a promotion focus. Support for this post-hoc 
evaluation can be found in Table 2 and 3 where achievement was more strongly related to 
promotion than prevention.  
Perhaps the most significant findings in the present study were the intermediary 
roles that prevention and promotion played (i.e., acting as ‘carriers’ for indirect effects). 
By testing mediation and subsequent indirect effects, I was able to get more at the process 
than strictly looking at one-to-one relationships. Previous work on the relationship 
between conscientiousness and safety performance has found conflicting results. Some 
researchers have found no relationship (e.g., Fallon et al., 2000) where as others have 
found a significant and negative relationship with unsafe behaviors (e.g., Wallace & 
Vodanovich, 2003b). In the current study, there were no direct relationships between the 
two facets of conscientiousness and safety performance or speed performance, but there 
were indirect effects. By using process models we might be better able to rectify some of 
the contradictory findings of previous research as it appears that distal individual 
differences do indeed relate to performance via regulatory processes.  
Safety climate has repeatedly been shown to positively relate to safety 
performance. I replicated this finding and extended it by demonstrating that some of the 
effects of safety climate are transmitted to safety performance via prevention focus. This 
lends further credence to the assertion I made in the introduction regarding Zohar’s 
(2002b) finding that safety improved when leaders communicated safety issues to 
subordinates and this could have been accomplished by the leaders creating a prevention 
focus in their subordinates. While I cannot concretely answer this assertion, my results 
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lend a great deal of support. Only future research will be able to definitively address this 
assertion. 
On a related note, it might also be that additional mediators exist that transmit 
some of the remaining effects of safety climate on safety performance not captured by 
prevention focus. Literature on cognitive interference/breakdown (Kanfer & Ackerman, 
1996, Sarason, 1975) suggests that anxiety and worry about current performance and off-
task concerns can disrupt attention and impede task execution and performance. Perhaps 
anxiety is reduced when supervisors stress safety and concern for employees, which 
might ultimately reduce the dispersion of resources between on and off task processes. 
This might allow employees to more fully devote resources towards task accomplishment 
rather than aimlessly worrying about supervisor expectations (cf. Sarason, 1975; Wallace 
& Chen, 2002). It would be beneficial to include ‘off-task’ regulatory processes into the 
current theoretical model to expand on the current findings.  
Similarly, promotion was found to be a carrier of production climate’s effects to 
speed and safety performance as well as carry the effects achievement to speed and safety 
performance. The lack of a direct relationship between production climate and speed 
performance was a bit surprising, but by following the suggestions of Kanfer (1990; 
1992) and looking at distal-proximal-performance relationships, I found indirect 
relationships via regulatory focus.  
If the mediation/indirect effect results were the most exciting, the most 
disappointing results were the lack of interactions. Out of curiosity, I plotted all the tested 
interactions and they seemed to be in the expected direction, but never reached 
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significance. There are several possible reasons for these non-significant results and the 
most obvious is lack of power.  
Moderated multiple regression tests are notoriously low on power (McClleland & 
Judd, 1993). One of the possible reasons for lack of power might be the small number of 
groups. Cohen’s power tables (1988), with power set at .80 and α = .05, suggests that the 
required sample size for a large effect (.35) is 26, for a moderate effect (.15) is 55, and for 
a small effect (.02) is 392 (Aiken & West, 1991). I was expecting a medium effect, but 
one caveat of these requirements is the assumption of no measurement error. Effect sizes 
drop as measurement error increases and subsequently, the sample required to detect the 
effect increases. For example, if the reliability drops from 1.0 to .80 the effect size is 
reduced by half and the necessary sample therefore needs to be doubled in order to have 
enough power to reach the same conclusions under the condition of no measurement 
error (Aiken & West, 1991). This suggests that under the current conditions I would need 
a larger sample of groups to detect the interactions (e.g., > 100) and perhaps this is the 
simplest solution. Another possibility might be to investigate these interactions in the lab 
in order to increase efficiency by using extreme group designs (McClleland & Judd, 
1993). Regardless, I do believe that such interactions are a possibility. 
Several interesting findings emerged between all of the ‘facet-like’ constructs in 
this study. That is, all of the constructs in the study can be considered approach-type 
constructs when considering the larger approach and avoid domains (Carver & Scheir, 
1981), but differ in how or what they approach. Sometimes like constructs were 
supportive or complimentary of each other (achievement & dependability) or conflicting 
with each other (safety v. production climate). Achievement and dependability are 
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general trait approach constructs, are positively related to each other, and can therefore be 
considered supportive of each other. Production climate and safety climate were 
conceptualized as competing climates and thus a negative relationship, whereas 
prevention and promotion were operationalized as independent. The performance 
domains were considered to be separate performance domains and a small negative 
relationships was found between them. This could have been expected because the work 
completed in this sample is inherently dangerous and in such an environment it is 
difficult to be fast and safe5 (Forster et al., 2003; Pate-Cornell, 1990). Similar to 
prevention and promotion, these results suggest that in the larger approach domain (i.e., 
discrepancy reducing), different approach and avoid strategies (safely, quickly) can be 
employed in the service of larger approach goals (complete tasks). 
These differences might have also affected some of the results due to the different 
pattern of correlations among ‘like-facets’. The mediation analyses could have been 
affected due to indirect effects having opposite signs than the direct effects (Smith et al., 
1992). For example, the direct effect of achievement on speed performance was .03 (ns), 
but the indirect effect was -.05 (p < .05). Such a scenario might lead to the effects 
‘canceling each other out’ and therefore the lack of a significant direct relationship and 
failure of mediation. Perhaps future technologies will allow for this model to be tested 
using multilevel structural equation modeling, which might alleviate these issues.   
Practical Implications 
                                                 
5 The performance ratings in the pilot study were moderately correlated (r = .37) but this was most likely 
due to self-report bias (i.e., employees believed that they were both fast & safe) and/or easier work. In this 
study supervisors rated performance.  
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There are several practical implications that can be derived from the results of the 
current study.  Forster et al. (2003) claimed that if a task or job is easy and/or safety is not 
an overriding concern, tasks could be framed in terms of gains and non-gains (i.e., a 
promotion focus). Performance might be maximized in such a work context where safety 
is not a concern. However, if safety is a concern in a task or job, then accuracy and safety 
is crucial for optimal productivity and the task and/or job should be framed in terms of 
non-loss/loss (i.e., prevention). While Forster et al. arrived at this conclusion using 
simple laboratory tasks, I have reach the same conclusion using real employees in jobs 
where safety is a major concern (i.e., 92.8% of participants reported that safety was a 
concern). Therefore, employers might reap more benefits (i.e., higher production, fewer 
accidents) if jobs that are relatively easy and routine are framed in promotion terms (i.e., 
gains & non-gains) and those jobs that are complex and dynamic, such as in the current 
study, are framed in prevention terms (i.e., non-losses & losses).  
Depending on the job, supervisor training aimed at prevention and promotion 
focus might allow organizations to improve their accident rates and production/task 
completion rates. For example, for organizations experiencing safety issues (e.g., poor 
safety performance, high accident rate) one might train supervisors to instill a higher and 
stronger safety climate (i.e., communicate safety procedures & increase the salience of 
possible negative outcomes) that would in turn produce a prevention focus. Likewise, in 
organizations where safety is not a concern, it might be possible to train supervisors to 
communicate production procedures and goals in an effort to instill a promotion focus 
and ultimately increase the speed at which tasks are completed. Future lab and field 
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research is needed to assess these manipulations and see if expected outcomes are 
affected (e.g., accidents, production). 
As stated in the literature review, it might also be possible to select for certain 
individual characteristics that lead to a desired focus. Of the two in the current study, it 
appears that dependability leads to a prevention focus, but achievement leads to both a 
prevention and promotion focus. Thus, for those organizations that deal in volatile work 
(e.g., chemical production, nuclear power) or work that deals with public safety (e.g., bus 
driver) it might be beneficial to select for highly dependable persons. Such highly 
dependable persons are organized and tend to follow standard operating procedures and 
should ultimately approach and focus on tasks in a safer manner than those that are 
unorganized and sloppy. Achievement could be selected for where safety is not an 
overriding concern. By integrating both the selection and training approach, organizations 
could possibly maximize the effectiveness of type of focus and possibly associated 
outcomes as well. However, since this is the only study that I am aware of to investigate 
and find these results, I would caution practitioners on implementation until further 
research has replicated these results. Thus, these results should be treated as tentative 
until confirmation has been reached.   
Limitations of the Study 
As with any study, there were limitations. One of which is the reliance on 
concurrent performance ratings. While the ratings were collected 1-3 weeks after 
employees completed their measures, this did not allow for a truly predictive study. This 
limits the causal inferences drawn from the study, because regulatory focus was not 
manipulated and just barely preceded the measurement of safety performance and speed 
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performance. Longitudinal and experimental replications would help increase the validity 
of our findings. However, this is substantial step over many studies that have relied upon 
self-report of safety ratings, even with many authors suggesting these ratings to be better 
(e.g., Barling et al., 2002). 
On a related note, stronger inferences could have been drawn if there had been a 
time lag between data collection for personality and climate facets and regulatory focus. 
That is, personality and climate only concurrently predicted regulatory focus. If these 
measures had been spaced out by time stronger inferences could have been made.   
As noted above, these results should be treated as tentative until future research 
can replicate these results. Another limitation related to this point, is the reliance on one 
sample. While the validation study demonstrated some generalizability, participants in 
that study were distributed across many organizations and geographic regions. It would 
be beneficial to examine these relationships in a similar organization where safety is a 
concern as well as an organization where safety is not an overriding concern.   
Lastly and as previously discussed, power might have been less than desirable to 
find the hypothesized interactions. While many of the expected relationships were found, 
it is believed that the low number of groups is the primary reason the cross-level 
person*situation interactions were not found.  
 Future Research 
 Perhaps the most pressing issue that directly relates to the current study is the 
need of future research to gain additional data to more fully evaluate the cross-level 
interactions that I believe to be influential in predicting promotion and prevention. Aside 
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from that endeavor, there are also numerous possibilities for future research and I will 
discuss many of these below.  
 To further validate prevention and promotion, hard accident and production data 
are needed. This would allow organizational researchers to better evaluate the benefits of 
each type of foci. Based on the findings in the present study and previous work, I would 
expect prevention to negatively relate to accidents and promotion to strongly and 
positively relate to production. Additionally, I would expect prevention to moderately 
relate to production. Ideally, I would have liked to collect these data for the current study, 
but to ensure enough variability in accidents I would need to have waited for several 
months (> 12 months). Similarly, how would performance ratings predict outcomes? I 
would expect safety performance to predict accidents and speed or productivity ratings to 
predict production. It would be quite interesting to see if productivity ratings positively 
predicted accidents and safety ratings positively predicted production. 
 Another possible avenue for research would be to investigate the relative effects 
of the higher order personality construct of conscientiousness and those of the facets. If 
‘big C’ is a better predictor of promotion and prevention, then perhaps it should be the 
choice of researchers and not the more specific facets. However, I would not expect this 
to be the case. Previous work (e.g., Moon, 2002) has found support for the facets as has 
this study. Regardless, this needs to be tested and documented.  
 Building off of the validation study, it would be quite interesting to investigate the 
peg that regulatory focus might fit in the larger goal-choice/goal-striving process. The 
validation study has demonstrated that regulatory focus is independent of goal-orientation 
and that both prevention and promotion are approach constructs. Additional support is 
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provided by Lee, Sheldon, and Turban (2003). They have demonstrated that goal 
orientation predicts one’s mental focus. Specifically, they found that learning goal 
orientation and performance prove positively predicted mental focus while avoid 
negatively predicted mental focus. While these relationships were quite weak, the study 
places regulatory focus in the goal striving domain after goal orientation, which suggest 
that one’s goal orientation leads to one’s regulatory focus. A logical next step would be to 
investigate such a model using regulatory focus (i.e., prevention & promotion) and not 
solely on one’s general mental focus (did you focus on the task or not).  
 I would also recommend that future research go back to the lab. It would be quite 
beneficial for researchers to manipulate climate and see how such manipulations 
influence one’s regulatory focus. Similarly, it might prove useful to manipulate 
leadership as it has been proposed and shown to lead to climate development (cf., 
Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; Wallace, Popp, & Mondore, 2004; Zohar, 2002b). Lab 
studies such as these should also allow researchers to better uncover those illusive cross-
level interactions.   
 Lastly, I would encourage researchers to cross-validate all of these findings in 
additional samples. Ideally, these studies would include samples in which safety is a 
concern and safety is not a concern. This will allow organizational researchers to more 
fully understand the processes involved in the time old tradeoff of working fast and 
working safe.  
 Conclusion  
 A multitude of research has examined several antecedents of occupational safety, 
but very limited work has attempted to examine why or how such relationships exist. 
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This dissertation attempted to do just that by integrating regulatory focus theory into a 
cross-level process model. This research supports the notion that aspects of self-
regulation are more proximal to performance and mediate (directly and/or indirectly) 
distal-performance relationship. Especially interesting in this study is the finding the 
regulatory processes are more proximal to safety performance and speed performance 
than either individual characteristics or group characteristics. This is important, because it 
has allowed and will continue to allow for greater integration among theories of work 
motivation, occupational safety, individuals, and work groups. These results show initial 
promise for both training and selection for improving (1) organizational safety and (2) 
organizational productivity. I encourage researchers to use this study as a stepping stone 
to gain further insight into the tradeoff between work safety and work speed in an effort 
to improve worker safety and organizational effectiveness. 
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This report is designed to convey the development and validation of three 
measures I will use in my larger dissertation project. Specifically, I developed and 
validated measures of regulatory focus (i.e., promotion focus & prevention focus), 
climate (i.e., safety & production climate), and performance (i.e., safety performance & 
speed performance). Below I outline the necessity of this work by construct followed by 
the methods employed and the results that were obtained.  
Regulatory Focus Validation 
 As described in my dissertation, regulatory focus theory delineates between two 
forms of goal pursuit that vary in the focus of regulatory activities and desired outcomes. 
On the one hand a person might employ a promotion focus strategy thereby tending to 
focus on those things that will lead to desired outcomes representing accomplishments 
and gains. On the other hand, one might employ a prevention focus strategy that will lead 
to desired outcomes such as personal safety. Higgins (1997) and Forster et al. (2003) 
have proposed that regulatory focus is a strategic tendency or concern that influences 
how persons approach and strive for desired outcomes. A strategic concern or strategy 
“refers to a pattern of decisions in the acquisition, retention, and utilization of 
information that serves to meet certain objectives (i.e., to insure certain forms of outcome 
and to insure against others”; Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956, p. 54). Therefore, 
regulatory focus is a cognitively based focus that drives behaviors towards desired 
outcomes and away form undesired outcomes.  
 Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes (1994) have suggested that RFT is an approach 
type of construct when focusing on the larger approach and avoid systems (Carver & 
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Scheir, 1981). More specifically, they suggested that promotion is more in tune with 
approach-approach (i.e., desire to approach the task & complete the task by approaching 
means necessary to accomplish the task) and prevention is more in tune with approach-
avoid (i.e., approach task and complete by avoiding those things that may deter 
successful task execution). Both promotion and prevention desire to reduce the 
discrepancy between the current state and the end state, hence the overall approach 
domain, but the manner in which they complete a task differs. Thus, different approach 
and avoidance strategies can be used in the service of the same general approach system. 
















 Numerous studies have examined regulatory focus but most have relied on 
manipulations to induce one focus or the other. A few studies have been conducted that 
measure regulatory focus with a short questionnaire (e.g., Higgins, Friedman, Harlow, 
Idson, Ayduk, & Taylor, 2001). However, this measure was developed to assess a stable 
individual difference variable and is not suited to assess the constructs in a work-oriented 
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environment. This type of measure was needed in the current study due to the focus on 
employee behavior and how one focuses on his or her work. 
 To validate this measure (and all other measures), I followed Hinkin’s (1998) 
organizational measure development plan. This plan is laid out in detail in the main 
portion of this dissertation (see p. 41-43). In short, I needed to create items based on the 
content domain, explore the psychometrics of the scale (e.g., internal consistency, factor 
analysis) and demonstrate construct validity. To gain construct validity I assessed the 
following nomological network of associations. 
 Nomological Network for Regulatory Focus 
 All expected relationships can be seen in Table 1 below. I describe these 
expectations below by construct.  
 
 
Table 1. Expectations for regulatory focus construct 
validation 
 
Constructs: Promotion Prevention 
Learning goal + + 
Performance approach ++ + 
Performance avoid - -- 
RFT – Promotion ++ + 
RFT – Prevention + ++ 
On Task ++ + 
Off Task - -- 
Neg Affect - - 
Safety Performance + ++ 
Speed Performance ++ + 
Safety Climate - + 
Production Climate + - 
 
 Goal Orientation 
 While RFT appears to be similar to goal orientation (Dweck & Leggett, 1988; 
Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Vandewalle, 1997) it differs from goal orientation because the 
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focus of RFT is on obtaining desired outcomes by focusing on certain aspects of the task 
in order to attain desired outcomes; not how or if they approach or avoid the goal or task. 
Any goal can be pursued with either a promotion or prevention strategy and therefore 
Higgins (1997) and Forster et al. (2003) have concluded that regulatory focus is 
independent of goal orientation. Initial empirical support has been provided by Lee, 
Sheldon, and Turban (2003). They have shown that goal orientation predicts one’s mental 
focus (i.e., degree to which someone is able to concentrate on an activity). Specifically, 
they found that learning goal orientation and performance prove positively predicted 
mental focus while avoid negatively predicted mental focus. These relationship were all 
weak and perhaps by differentiating between ‘types of mental focus’ (i.e., promotion & 
prevention) one might be better able to capture these relationships and place regulatory 
focus in a larger nomological network of associations. Based on these findings and the 
theoretical suggestions by Higgins (1997) and Forster et al (2003), I expect positive 
relationships between learning goal orientation, performance prove goal orientation and 
promotion and prevention, but negative relationships between performance avoid and 
promotion and prevention.  
With respect to a performance prove goal I expect that a stronger positive 
relationship will emerge between promotion and performance prove rather than between 
prevention and performance prove. This is due to the belief that promotion focus persons 
desire to get ahead and gain a lot. This is similar to the orientation of a performance 
prove person in that they desire to demonstrate competence (VandeWalle, 1997), in part 
by accomplishing tasks. In other words, both can be conceptualized as approach-
approach constructs and thus the stronger relationship.  
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With regard to performance avoid, a desire on avoiding negation of one’s 
competence, I expect negative relationships due to such an individual’s tendency or 
desire to escape task engagement, possess high levels of anxiety, and withdraw effort 
from task engagement. Neither a promotion or prevention focus can be captured by 
avoiding the task or reducing effort and thus the expectation of negative relationships. 
However, a stronger negative relationship might be found between prevention and 
performance avoid due to avoiding nature of the constructs, albeit avoiding different 
things (i.e., performance avoid avoiding the task & prevention avoiding mismatches to 
task completion). 
On & Off Task Effort 
Both promotion and prevention fall into the larger approach domain (Higgins, 
1997). Thus, they are focusing on completing the task and devoting resources towards 
task accomplishment. However, the direction of resource allocation differs. When 
applying a promotion strategy, resources are directed to gain positive outcomes during 
task completion (i.e., resources are directed towards those things that will maximize 
gains). When applying a prevention strategy, resources are directed to avoid negative 
outcomes and obstacles to ensure task completion (i.e., focusing on those aspects of the 
task to ensure safety & non-losses). Thus, I expect positive relationships between on task 
effort and promotion and prevention. However, based on the different foci of resource 
allocation, I expect on task effort to be more strongly related to promotion than 
prevention. The reverse pattern of relationships is expected with regards to off task effort.  
Trait-Like Regulatory Focus 
108 
Due to the nature of the regulatory focus, I expect stronger positive relationships 
between like constructs (i.e., trait-like promotion and promotion strategy, trait-like 
prevention and prevention strategy) rather than opposing constructs.  
Negative Affect 
Negative Affect is a general dimension of subjective distress and unpleasurable 
engagement that subsumes a variety of aversive states, including anger, contempt, 
disgust, guilt, fear, and nervousness” (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988, p. 1063). 
Accordingly, such persons divide resources between off-task cognitions such as worry 
and on-task behaviors whereas those with more positive affect tend to focus more fully 
on task-relevant stimuli by not dividing their resources (Sarason, 1975). As such, 
regulation deficits result from attention being allocated to off-task behaviors and not to 
task engagement (Mikulincer, 1989). Therefore I expect both prevention and promotion 
to be negatively related to negative affect.  
Climate 
As discussed at length in the literature review of the dissertation, I expect safety 
climate to positively relate to prevention and negatively relate to promotion. I expect the 
reverse pattern of relationships among production climate and prevention and promotion. 
However, results with regard to climate, should be interpreted as psychological climate 
(i.e., individual perceptions of climate, not group climate). Due to the nature of data 
collection, I was not able to aggregate this data. The larger portion of the dissertation will 
enable me to accurately assess climate as a group level construct.  
Performance 
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Again, as discussed in detail in the literature review of the dissertation, I expect a 
prevention focus to positively relate to safety performance. Likewise, I expect a 
promotion focus to positively relate to speed performance (i.e., how much and how 
quickly tasks are completed). I expected negative relationships between prevention and 
speed and promotion and safety.  
Climate Validation 
The other predictor measures I needed to validate were my measures of climate; 
specifically, safety climate and production climate.  The safety climate measure has been 
validated in prior research (Zohar, 2000), but the measure of production climate is new. 
Thus, I needed to demonstrate these climates were distinct from each other as well as 
show differential relationships with leadership behaviors. The expected pattern of 
relationships to be tested can be seen in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2. Expectations for climate construct validation 
 
Constructs Safety Climate Production Climate 
Consideration + - 
Initiating Structure + - 
Safety Performance ++ 0 
Speed Performance 0 ++ 
 
Nomological Network for Climate 
Safety Climate “relates to shared perceptions with regard to safety policies 
procedures, and practices” (Zohar, 2002, p. 125). Safety climate is not concerned with 
formal policies and procedures, which are usually explicit, but rather enforced (i.e., 
informal) practices. Employees usually follow the enacted or policy-in-action practices 
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required by supervisors and not the formal policies, procedures, and practices requested 
by the organization as a whole. Thus, safety climate needs to be assessed in the 
functional role rather than the formal role. The same can be said for other climate facets 
as well (e.g., production climate). Enforced safety policies, procedures, and practices 
reflect the relative priorities of the unit of analysis regarding safety and might fluctuate 
based on productivity. Additionally, such policies, procedures, and practices rely on 
supervisory input to create a sort of ambient stimuli (Hackman, 1992) and one might 
confuse such practices with group leadership. 
Leadership 
Zohar (2000) has discussed the distinction between supervisory practices, such as 
climate, and group leadership. Leadership perceptions relate to stable behavioral 
attributes that are invariant across tasks whereas climate perceptions relate to the relative 
emphasis or priority of tasks. Zohar claimed that “climate and leadership are qualitatively 
different constructs, relating to independent dimensions of supervisory behavior” (p. 
590). Zohar, has demonstrated that certain leadership styles relate to safety climate when 
the exchange between supervisor and employee is perceived as positive. For example, 
transformational leadership has been shown to positively relate to safety climate (Zohar, 
2002, Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002). Other leadership styles have not been 
thoroughly investigated, but offer an opportunity to validate Zohar’s (2000) claim. It 
seems fruitful to revisit the Ohio State leadership studies to demonstrate Zohar’s claim by 
examining the relationship safety climate and production climate share with leadership 
styles of consideration and initiating structure. Consideration is the degree to which a 
leader shows concern and respect to his or her employees as well as being respectful and 
111 
appreciative of efforts. Initiating structure is the degree to which a supervisors defines 
employee roles and expectations (Fleishman, 1973). 
Social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) suggests that an implicit obligation for future 
reciprocity develops when one party (e.g., leader) benefits another party (e.g., employee) 
and this relationship strengthens over time. In the safety climate literature social 
exchange theory seems to be highly relevant as numerous researchers (e.g., Zohar, 1980, 
2000; Hoffman & Morgeson, 1999; Mueller, DaSilva, Townsend, & Tetrick, 1998) have 
stated that management’s commitment to safety and one’s demonstration of such values 
is a major factor that affects worker safety and ultimately the success of any safety 
initiative. Following the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) it seems that the more 
concern and better interaction the better the safety climate.  
Both consideration and initiating structure leadership styles can be conceptualized 
as positive leadership styles. A recent meta-analytic study demonstrated that both styles 
positively related to group performance, satisfaction with leader, follower job 
satisfaction, and follower motivation (Judge, Piccolo, & Illies, in press) Thus, it seems 
that both styles demonstrate concern and should therefore positively relate to safety 
climate. While the concern coupled with consideration is obvious, the concern coupled 
with initiating structure is less obvious and is focused more on the work rather than the 
person. Regardless, both styles demonstrate stable patterns of concern and positive 
exchange relationships. Thus, I expect positive relationships between consideration, 
structure, and safety climate. However, I expect negative relationships between 
production climate and these two leadership styles because production climate stresses 
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work completion at the cost of personal concern, safety, and generally poor exchanges 
take place (e.g., I don’t care just get the work done).  There is no reciprocal relationship.  
Performance 
In the larger dissertation I discuss the relationships expected between safety 
climate and safety performance, as well as empirical support for this relationship. 
Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between safety climate and safety 
performance. Likewise, I expect a positive relationship between production climate and 
speed performance.  
Method 
 Participants 
All participants were recruited from a web based panel of participants. 
StudyResponse.org is a web site devoted to connecting behavioral researchers to 
participants for survey administration. There are almost 40,000 registered participants 
with numerous occupational groups to choose from for a nominal fee. For the current 
study I sampled 1000 employees in three occupational groups: (1) 
transportation/warehousing, (2) Construction/Mining, & (3) Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing. 
These occupations were chosen as they have historically been labeled as dangerous and 
demanding jobs. A return rate of 25% was obtained, but 38 of the surveys were not 
complete giving me a total useable sample of 212. This return rate is not uncommon 
using this panel. The average age was 38.9 (SD = 10.0) with 110 females, 99 males, and 
3 not reported. The average tenure in the current position was 11.3 months (SD=8.1). 
Additionally, 78% of the sample claimed safety was a major issue in their daily work.  
Measures 
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Measures used in the current report can be found in the Measure Appendix.  
Regulatory Focus 
Twenty-one items were written to assess regulatory focus: 10 items for prevention 
and 11 items for promotion. Items were written based on the content domain of each 
focus. Initial content validation by subject matter experts (15 I/O graduate students & 3 
PhD I/O Psychologists) revealed no poor items. Content validation consisted of sorting 
items based on construct definitions.   
Goal Orientation 
Vandewalle’s (1997) goal orientation measure was used. It contains three factors: 
learning goal orientation (5 items), performance prove goal orientation (4 items), and 
performance avoid goal orientation (4 items).  
On and Off Task Effort 
Kanfer, Ackerman, Murtha, & Dugdale’s (1994) measure of on and off task effort 
was used. Items were reworded to reflect general job tasks rather than specific tasks 
required by an air traffic controller. I used 8 on task items and 6 off task items.  
Trait-Like Regulatory Focus 
An 11 item scale designed by Higgins et al., (2001) was used to assess trait-like 
regulatory focus. The scale inquires about childhood and developmental experiences that 
might have helped shaped one’s focus to prevention or promotion. The scale has been 




Negative affect was assessed using the markers of negative affect from the 
Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988). It consists of 
10-items inquiring about the frequency of negative feelings experienced while at work 
Performance 
Two measures of performance were developed: safety performance and speed 
performance. The measure of safety performance used was adapted from Hofmann and 
Stetzor’s (1996) general safety scale and general items from Burke, Sarpy, Tesluk, & 
Smith-Crowe’s (2002) scale. Both previous scales had been well validated. I felt items 
from both scales could be combined to arrive at a better general safety performance 
measure. The safety performance measure contains 7 items. Speed performance items 
were written to reflect how quickly employees complete tasks and how many tasks they 
complete. The scale contains 6 items. To ascertain distinct performance measures, I will 
examine the factor structure of these scales as well. Content validity has already been 
gained using the same sample of SMEs as for regulatory focus. No items failed to meet 
the 75% cutoff.  
Climate 
 Two measures of climate were developed by adapting previous measures. 
Specifically I adapted Zohar’s (2000) safety climate measure and developed a production 
climate measure. This left me with 8 safety climate items and 10 production climate 
items. For the production climate items I intentionally over sampled the content domain 
in hopes of reducing the scale via factor analysis. Content validity has already been 
gained using the same sample of SMEs as for regulatory focus and performance. No 
items failed to meet the 75% cutoff.  
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Leadership Behaviors.  
The Leadership Behavior Description Questionnaire (LBDQ; Stogdill, 1963) 
contains 40 items with two factors: Consideration and Initiating Structure.  
Procedure  
All measures were located on a web page were participants could complete the 
measures at their leisure after receiving a recruitment e-mail. Once the measures were 
completed the participant submitted their responses. All data was loaded into SPSS 
directly and recoded as needed automatically.  
Data Analysis Plan 
For this initial validation, I desired to cover four of Hinkin’s (1998) steps. Step 
one (i.e., content validity) has already been completed. The next step is initial item 
reduction via internal consistency analysis. After which I will explore the factor structure. 
Initially, I will examine the scree plots associated with each factor analysis as well as 
factors with large eigenvalues (> 1) using a principle components analysis. After 
examining the unrotated factor structure I will examine the structure using a varimax 
rotation. I will remove any item that fails to load greater than .40 or any item that cross-
loads greater than .40. Ideally, this will leave me with support for the factor structure of 
each measure. Once I have reached a simple structure I will reexamine the internal 
consistency of each scale to ascertain if it is at least .70 or greater. The next step will be 




All developed scales possessed adequate internal consistencies with the exception 
of the production climate scale (α=.61). Three items had poor item-total correlations and 
were dropped resulting in a much improved internal consistency value (α=.83). All 
values were again computed after the factor analyses and can be found in the correlation 
table (Table 8).  
Exploratory Factor Analyses 
Regulatory Focus 
The factor analysis identified 5 factors for regulatory focus (i.e., eigenvalues > 
1.0), but two of the factors had very large eigenvalues (i.e., >3.5) while the other three 
had eigenvalues less than 2. Additionally, when examining the scree plot it appeared that 
the three smaller factors were in the scree (i.e., rocks at the bottom) while the two larger 
factors were not. Therefore, I decided to request a two factor solution using a varimax 
rotation. This analysis left me with two clean factors accounting for a total of 48% of the 
variance. The first factor accounted for 25% of the variance and the second factor 
accounted for 23% of the variance. Loadings for these factors can be found in Table 3. 
All items loaded on the correct scale and there were no high cross loadings or negative 




Table 3. Regulatory Focus Factor Analysis 
 
Items Prevention Promotion 
1. .68 -.04 
2. .63 .25 
3.  .62 .08 
4. .64 .25 
5. .68 .03 
6. .64 .22 
7. .67 .05 
8. .59 .27 
9. .69 -.13 
10.  .69 -.06 
11. .61 .32 
12. .18 .65 
13. .19 .73 
14. .05 .57 
15. -.07 .85 
16. -.02 .82 
17. .01 .69 
18. .10 .62 
19. .26 .66 
20. .12 .57 




The unrotated solution suggested a two factor solution. Much like the regulatory 
focus analysis there were two large factors and one small factor. I decided to request a 
two factor solution using varimax rotation. This analysis yielded a clean structure for 
safety but not for production climate. Several production climate items had high cross-
loadings and were subsequently dropped. This left me with 5 production climate items 
and 7 safety climate items. I again ran the factor analysis with the revised items and this 
analysis yielded a much cleaner solution. This solution accounted for 60% of the variance 
with safety climate accounting for 36% and production climate accounting for 24%. The 
item loadings for this solution are presented in Table 4. 
 
 






1. .82 -.07 
2. .82 -.02 
3. .81 -.01 
4. .75 .16 
5. .76 .21 
6. .68 -.21 
7. .69 -.18 
8. .17 .73 
9. .04 .81 
10. .01 .82 
11. -.18 .79 
12. -.08 .48 
 
Performance 
Similar to the previous factor analyses, two larger factors emerged with a smaller 
third factor. Thus, I requested a two factor solution with a varimax rotation. This yielded 
a solution with a few cross-loadings. I removed these items and reanalyzed the factor 
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structure. This yielded a clean structure accounting for 67% of the variance with safety 
performance accounting for 43% and speed performance accounting for 24% (see table 5 
for item loadings).  
 






2. .57 .06 
3. .76 .23 
4. .91 .15 
5. .93 .15 
6. .91 18 
7. .86 .08 
9. .16 .82 
10. .11 .92 
11. .06 .78 
12. .21 .67 
14. .34 .59 
 
 
Nomological Network of Associations 
The nomological network of associations supported the majority of relationships 
that were expected. All correlations, descriptives, and internal consistencies are presented 
in Table 8.  
Regulatory Focus 




Table 6. Expectations and results of regulatory focus construct validation 
 
 Promotion Prevention 
Constructs: Expectations Results Expectations Results 
Learning goal + .40* + .28* 
Performance prove ++ .37* + .08 
Performance avoid - -.03 -- -.18* 
RFT – Promotion ++ .18* + .06 
RFT – Prevention + .06 ++ .04 
On Task ++ .67* + .39* 
Off Task - -.01 -- - .14* 
Neg Affect - -.11 - -.30* 
Safety Performance + .04 ++ .42* 
Speed Performance ++ .46* + .24* 
Safety Climate - .13 + .21* 
Production Climate + .14* - .09 
Note. Double signs (e.g., ++) are compared to the opposing relationships. For example, it 
was expected that the positive relationship would be stronger for promotion and 
performance prove than prevention and performance prove.  
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Goal Orientation 
Positive relationships were found between learning goal orientation and both 
promotion (r =.40) and prevention (r =.28) focus as expected. Promotion was found to be 
positively related to performance prove (r =.37), as expected, but not significantly related 
to performance avoid (r =-.03). Prevention was found to be negatively related to 
performance avoid (r =-.18), as expected, but not to performance prove (r =.08). The 
results tend to support the approach-approach aspect of promotion focus and the 
approach-avoid aspect of prevention focus. These results go a long way in distinguishing 
regulatory focus from goal orientation and are the first results to empirically demonstrate 
these relationships.  
Trait Regulatory Focus 
Relationships with Higgins’ measures of regulatory focus were not as clean as 
one would expect. I expected strong positive relationships between like factors, but this 
was not the case. There was only one significant relationship and that was between 
promotion factors (r =.18). Perhaps these results are due to the vast differences in the 
measures. Higgins’ measures pertain to childhood experience and developmental paths 
whereas my measure relates to how one focuses resources during task and work 
engagement. Additionally, it appears that my new measure better relates to constructs 
expected to relate to promotion and prevention than Higgins’ measures. For example, 
Higgins’ prevention only related to safety performance and while this is noteworthy, the 
relationship was small (r =.15). Promotion on the other hand tended to relate to a great 
deal more. Interestingly, it related to safety performance and speed performance in about 
the same magnitude. One would expect promotion to be more strongly related to speed 
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performance than safety performance. Therefore, it seems that this measure is not well 
suited to capture work related behaviors.  
On and Off Task Effort 
Promotion was found to be strongly related to on task effort (r =.67) as was 
prevention (r =.39). On the other hand only prevention had a negative relationship with 
off task effort (r =-.14) while promotion did not. This further strengthens the argument 
that prevention fits into the approach-avoid domain, while promotion fits into the 
approach-approach domain.  
Negative Affect 
 Negative Affect was only found to significantly relate to prevention (r =-.30). 
The relationship between promotion and negative affect was only marginally significant, 
but quite weak (r =-.11). Again, this lends support for the approach-approach dominion 
of promotion and approach-avoid dominion of prevention.  
Performance 
 Most interesting were the relationships with performance measures. While they 
were self-report, self-reports of safety performance have been shown to be highly related 
to supervisory reports of safety performance (Wallace & Vodanovich, 2003). Promotion 
was strongly related to speed performance (r =.46), while prevention was strongly related 
to safety performance (r =.42). Additionally, prevention was moderately related to speed 
performance (r =.24), but no significant relationship was found between promotion and 
safety performance.  
Climate 
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It was expected that safety climate would positively relate to prevention and 
negatively relate to promotion. The reverse expectations were presented for production 
climate. It was found that safety climate related to prevention (r = .21), but did not 
significantly relate to promotion. On the other hand, production climate related to 
promotion (r = .14), but did not significantly relate to prevention.  
Climate 
Table 7 contains the pattern of correlations with regard to the expectations for 
climate.  
 
Table 7. Expectations and results of climate construct validation 
 
 Safety Climate Production Climate 
Constructs: Expectations Results Expectations Results 
Consideration + .59* - -.27* 
Initiating Structure + .47* - -.04 
Safety Performance + .27* 0 -.09 
Speed Performance 0 .02 + .13† 
 
Leadership Behaviors 
The main focus of this portion of the validation was to discriminate climate 
variables from stable leader behaviors. For the most part this was accomplished. For 
example, safety climate positively related to consideration (r =.59), initiating structure (r 
=.47), and safety performance (r = .27), while production climate negatively related to 
consideration (r = -.27) and marginally related to speed performance (r = .13, p = .06). 
However, there is a great deal of sharedness between leadership behaviors and safety 
climate. Social exchange theory might suggest that such steady leadership behaviors lead 
to a better climate and thus develops a reciprocal relationship between leaders and 
employees where employees feel obliged to behave in a safe manner. A production 
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climate is not likely to emerge from positive leadership behaviors (i.e., concern, positive 
exchanges) and thus the lack of relationships. Perhaps other forms of leadership lead to a 
production climate, especially those that are not perceived as positive (e.g., laissez-faire, 
corrective) One must remember that these results only reflect psychological climate, not 




Table 8. Correlations among all variables 
 
Variables  M SD 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.    8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 
1. promotion 38.2 6.6 .88    
2. prevention 50.2 4.4 .28* .86    
3. L.GO. 25.9 3.6 .40* .28* .78   
4. P.GO. 16.7 4.7 .37* .08 .26* .83   
5. A.GO. 10.2 4.9 -.03 -.18* -.30* .20* .89   
6.Higgins Promotion 20.9 2.9 .18* .06 .36* .01 -.31* .60   
7. Higgins Prevention 14.3 1.7 .06 .04 .08 -.06 .01 .07 .71    
8. On-Task 30.5 4.9 .67* .39* .40* .35* .01 .29* .05 .83   
9. Off-Task 16.8 4.3 -.01 -.14* -.16* .23* .55* -.36* -.08 .02 .73   
10. Negative Affect 16.1 5.1 -.11 -.30* -.25* -.10 .32* -.21* -.12 -.15* .32* .86   
11. Safety Perf.  25.6 4.5 .04 .42* .13 .01 -.24* .29* .15* .21* -.28* -.27* .91   
12. Speed Perf.  15.6 2.5 .46* .24* .32* .12 -.30* .27* .09 .36* -.24 -.12 .37* .75   
13. Consideration 47.5 8.3 .12 .09 .17* .16* -.05 .25* .05 .29* -.07 -.15* .14* .06 .78  
14. In. Structure 52.1 9.4 .06 .16* .01 .09 -.03 .14* .12 .25* .01 -.07 .25* .05 .55* .86   
15. Safety Climate 19.3 5.7 .13 .21* .14 .04 -.04 .01 -.05 .32* -.06 -.20* .27* .02 .59* .47* .88  
16. Prod. Climate 16.9 4.2 .14* .09 -.05 .09 .17* -.05 .00 .16   .20* .19* -.09 .13 -.27* -.04* -.14* .78 
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Discussion 
This report documents the initial validation of the three measures: a new work 
oriented measure of regulatory focus, two climate scales designed to assess safety climate 
and production climate, and two performance measures (i.e., safety performance and 
speed performance). A great deal of support has been gained for all three measures. 
Specifically, by following the organizational measure development plan proposed by 
Hinkin (1998) I have obtained reliable and valid measures of the constructs and specific 
factors for each construct I intended. There were some unexpected findings and as 
previously discussed some of these findings lend support to validity of the measures. For 
example, prevention did not relate to performance prove, but did relate to performance 
avoid, which supports the notion that prevention is an approach-avoid construct. 
Similarly, promotion related to performance prove, but not to performance avoid, which 
supports promotion as an approach-approach construct.  
In the larger portion of the dissertation I will revisit the psychometrics of each 
scale and employ the factor structure to confirmatory factor analysis. Ideally this 
approach will yield similar results. I will also gain additional construct and criterion 
related validity by examining the proposed model in the introduction of my dissertation.  
127 
APPENDIX B: EMPLOYEE MEASURES 
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Regulatory Focus Questionnaire 
 
The following items are examples of different approaches or concerns you might 
have when working. Using the scale below, please rate how often you focus on these 
thoughts and activities.  
 
            Never                    Rarely        Occasionally               Often      Constantly 
<--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--> 
               (1)           (2)     (3)            (4)       (5) 
              
PLEASE NOTE:   
• There are no right or wrong answers.  Simply describe yourself honestly 
• In deciding on your answer, consider how you complete your work 
 
I focus on: 
 
1. _____ following rules and regulations at work 
2. _____ being ready for any changes in my work (e.g., new procedures/equipment) 
3. _____ completing work tasks correctly 
4. _____ doing my duty at work 
5. _____ following standard operating procedures while working 
6. _____ my work responsibilities 
7. _____ completing my work in a cautious manner  
8. _____ fulfilling my work obligations 
9. _____ ensuring safety while working 
10. _____ completing work tasks safely 
11. _____ on the details of my work 
12. _____ finishing work tasks quickly  
13. _____ accomplishing a lot at work 
14. _____ getting my work done no matter what 
15. _____ completing a lot of work assignments quickly 
16. _____ getting a lot of work finished in a short amount of time 
17. _____ work activities that allow me to get ahead at work 
18. _____ my work accomplishments 
19. _____ completing my work in an eager manner 
20. _____ getting ahead in my job/career 
21. _____ how many job tasks I can complete 
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Conscientiousness Facets 
Below are phrases describing people's behaviors. Please use the rating scale below to 
describe how accurately each statement describes you. Describe yourself as you generally 
are now, not as you wish to be in the future.  
 
strongly                                           neither agree                                       strongly 
disagree                disagree             nor disagree            agree                     agree 
<--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--> 
   (1)           (2)      (3)            (4)                 (5) 
 
 
1.    ______ Try to follow the rules  
2.    ______  Keep my promises 
3.    ______  Pay my bills on time 
4.    ______  Tell the truth 
5.    ______  Listen to my conscience 
6.    ______  Break rules 
7.    ______  Break my promises  
8.    ______  Get others to do my duties  
9.    ______  Do the opposite of what is asked  
10.  ______  Misrepresent the facts  
11.   ______  Go straight for the goal 
12.   ______  Work hard 
13.  ______  Turn plans into actions 
14.   ______  Plunge into tasks with all my heart 
15.   ______  Do more than what's expected of me 
16.   ______  Set high standards for myself and others 
17.   ______  Demand quality 
18.   ______  Am not highly motivated to succeed  
19.   ______  Do just enough work to get by 




The following statements pertain to your supervisor’s behavior at work.  Indicate to 
what extent you agree with each of the statements below.  Please use the following 
scale to record your answers in the space beside each item: 
 
Completely          Neither Agree                      Completely 
Disagree      Disagree        Nor Disagree       Agree             Agree 
<--|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|----------------------|--> 




1) _____My supervisor says a good word whenever he sees a job done according to 
 the safety rules.  
2) _____My supervisor seriously considers any worker’s suggestions for improving      
    safety 
3) _____My supervisor approaches workers during work to discuss safety issues  
4) _____My supervisor gets annoyed with any worker ignoring safety issues, even           
    minor rules              
5) _____My supervisor watches more often when a worker has violated some safety rule 
6) _____As long as there is no accident, my supervisor doesn’t care how the work is done              
7) _____My supervisor pays more attention to safety problems than most other  
    supervisors in this company  
8) _____My supervisor encourages us to get the job done as quickly as possible.  
9) _____My supervisor does not like it when tasks take more time to complete than     
           he/she thinks they should             
10) _____My supervisor asks us to work fast 
11) _____My supervisor doesn’t care how the work is completed as long as it is completed   
           quickly (dropped) 
12) _____Whenever pressure builds up, my supervisor wants us to work faster                 
13) _____My supervisor pays less attention to productivity than most other  
    supervisors (dropped) 
14) _____My supervisor only notices things that slow down our work  (dropped)        
15) _____As long as work remains ahead of schedule, my supervisor doesn’t care  
           how this has been achieved
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Additional Information:  
1. What is your age: ____________________________ 
2. Is safety a concern in your job: Yes / No 
3. How long have you been employed in your current job? ___________________ 
4. What is your race: ________________________ 
5. What is your gender : _____________________ 
6. How many work accidents have you been involved in over the past 3 years: _____ 
7. What type of work do you do: ________________________________ 
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Employee Name (person being rated):_______________________________________________ 
 
Your Name (Name of person completing the rating): ___________________________________ 
 
Below are several work-related behaviors.  Using the scale found at the top of the survey, please indicate 
how often this employee performs the behavior at work by circling the appropriate number. 
 
 
1.  _____  Performing a job for which there is a better  method (dropped) 
2.   _____ Leaves a work site before completely storing all tools, materials, or hazards 
3.   _____ Carries out work in a safe manner  
4.   _____ Uses all the necessary safety equipment   
5.   _____ Uses the correct safety procedures for carrying out job tasks  
6.    _____ Ensures the highest levels of safety when carrying out his/her job  
7.   _____ Uses appropriate personal protective equipment as indicated by the site health and safety plan 
8.   _____ Completes job tasks quickly 
9.   _____ Accomplishes a great deal of work in a short time period 
10. _____ Finishes work tasks ahead of other workers 
11. _____ Takes short-cuts to complete job tasks (dropped) 
12. _____ Fails to finish work tasks 
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